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ABSTRACT
Essays on Status Perceptions within the Workplace
By
Juanita Forrester
December, 2017

Committee Chair: Nikos Dimotakis
Academic Unit: Department of Managerial Sciences

Status, or a person’s ranking within a hierarchy, is a core organizing principle for social
dynamics within the workplace. Those with high status receive a broad range of social, material,
and psychological privileges by virtue of their social standing. For example, status is linked to
high levels of social attention, including interest and respect from others, material rewards in the
form salary and bonuses, and psychological benefits including autonomy, control, and well-being
(Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). For these reasons, the question of why and how status is ascribed
and the behaviors that follow these arrangements are of critical importance to people and groups
within organizations.
This work focuses on exploring the perceptual nature of status. Across three essays, I
explore where status perceptions come from and the processes that influence whether status
assignments create or disrupt social harmony. First, I present a theoretical discussion of the
possible sources and outcomes of status disagreement. Next, I explain how individual-level
differences in ideology may lead to divergent patterns in the way that people strive for status,
assign status to others, and make status-based inferences. Finally, I examine how situational
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factors influence how well actors in high and low status roles work with others to achieve
collaborative or competitive goals. Below, I provide a more specific overview of each of these
three essays.
The first essay focuses specifically on the phenomenon of status disagreement (Kilduff et
al., 2016), or instances when people disagree about who belongs at the top and bottom of a status
hierarchy. While we have reason to believe that status disagreement is a common real-world
occurrence, our understanding of the origins of this concept and its consequences is only
beginning to emerge. This work makes two main contributions to existing knowledge. First, this
essay expands our consideration of the sources of status disagreement by illustrating the potential
for variation within three overlapping conceptual dimensions: personal motives, information,
ideals. Second, this work broadens the range of possible consequences that might emerge from
status disagreement, outlining the potential for both group-level and individual-level outcomes.
The second essay focuses on ideology as an individual-level difference that leads to
variation in how people strive to attain status, ascribe status to others, and make inferences about
the value of others’ contributions. I propose that those who are high on social dominance
orientation, or hierarchy-enhancing beliefs that support hierarchy and inequality, are more likely
to value behaviors that signal competence. In contrast, those who are low on social dominance
orientation, or hierarchy-attenuating beliefs that support equality and the distribution of
opportunity, are more likely to value behaviors that signals warmth. These processes have
important implications for foundational workplace practices, including recruitment, selection and
performance appraisals.
In the third essay, I explore how status may derive its meaning from situational
characteristics that encourage competitive or collaborative goals. Whereas most of our current
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knowledge on status hierarchies suggests that high status actors work best with low status
partners, I suggest that two high status actors can develop effective synergies when they are
prompted to focus on shared goals. That is, collaborative settings may simultaneously allow high
status actors to leverage the psychological benefits of self-perceived status beliefs while also
reducing feelings of threat that decrease shared performance. This work adds nuance to prior
findings by illuminating situational contingencies that influence status-based interactions.
Together, these essays suggest that status is in the eye of the beholder. Status
arrangements are not always the subject of shared consensus, but may also be the topic of
perceptual differences. Moreover, situational characteristics may influence how status is enacted
via behaviors. This work takes steps to unpack common theoretical assumptions regarding
shared information, ideals, and self-interest. In doing so, I hope to illustrate that variation in the
way in which status is perceived, achieved, and enacted has important implications for a range of
workplace processes.
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ESSAY ONE
SOURCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF STATUS DISAGREEMENT
We all develop beliefs about ourselves and the people around us in order to help us interpret
our place in the social world. Of these beliefs, social status represents one of the most
meaningful indicators of our value to others and greater society. Status, or a person’s relative
position within a social hierarchy, refers to inequality based on differences in honor, esteem, and
respect (Ridgeway, 2014). Those who possess status experience a wide range of social, material,
and psychological benefits by virtue of their standing relative to others. In the workplace, high
status is associated with social attention in the form of deference from others, access to material
resources such as superior pay, and psychological rewards including high levels of autonomy,
control, and well being (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). Yet, both researchers and practitioners tend
to assume that status is a static, universal outcome of social consensus, rather than a dynamic
construct that is often the subject of conflict and disagreement. I propose that status
disagreements, or occurrences when people have perceptual disagreements about their place and
the place of others within a status hierarchy, are more common than previously assumed.
Further, this work outlines the potential sources of status disagreement within the workplace and
examines the consequences for people and organizations.
Status is commonly defined as the level of prominence, respect, and influence commanded
by an individual in the eyes of others (Anderson & Kilduff, 2002). In other words, status is
viewed as a positional indicator of a person’s ranking within a particular social context
(Ridgeway, 2014). Whereas researchers have been careful to highlight that status is by definition
assigned by others, fewer studies have focused on how this process and its conclusions might be
perceived by the focal person. This has led to many researchers overlooking the importance of
how people see themselves and the extent to which this evaluation corresponds with the opinions
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of others. That is, how do people formulate meta-perceptions about how they are viewed within a
social context? The distinction between how people view themselves and how they are viewed
by others and the space in between these perspectives is of critical importance, since people act
upon their own perceptions but are subject, for better or worse, to the perceptions of their
interaction partners. Further, there are at least two intriguing scenarios that sprout from a
comparison of individuals’ beliefs about how they actually perceived by others and how they
should be perceived by others in terms of their ranking within a social hierarchy. For instance,
what happens when people are accurate about others’ perceptions, but believe that they deserve
higher levels of respect than they are given? Further, what happens when people are inaccurate
about how they are viewed, and overestimate the level of respect, prominence, and influence
endowed upon them by social partners? Here, we refer to these possibilities as incidences of
status disagreement.
With few exceptions, workplace research depicts the formation of social status
hierarchies as systematically constructed (Berger et al., 1972; 1980), self-perpetuating and stable
(Anderson et al. 2001; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). According to this view, status hierarchies
emerge from a process wherein all members reach agreement as to who is most and least
deserving of status and arrange themselves accordingly. Further, it is typically assumed that
status hierarchies are stable in that those with high status are recognized as such by all,
successfully claiming associated benefits in a universal manner. More recently, work has
emerged that challenges this assumption, portraying status as a competition for dominance and
power (Bendersky & Hays, 2012. Kilduff, Willer & Anderson, 2016). By elucidating how
employees are motivated to climb the social ladder in order to reap relevant rewards (Anderson
& Kilduff, 2010), such work underscores the importance of examining status as a domain of
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conflict. Thus, while we are beginning to understand the frequency of divergent perceptions of
status (Kilduff, Willer, & Anderson, 2016), we still know relatively little about the origins of
status disagreement or the conditions that fuel its growth. If we are to assume that status is
sometimes located at the center of social battle, we should benefit from an improved theoretical
understanding as to why disagreement arises and in turn, how it sparks a range of work-related
consequences for those involved. This work demonstrates how casting status as a context-driven
process of subjective evaluation (e.g., Jensen et al., 2011; Podolny, 1993; Stewart, 2005) allows
us to anticipate the divergence of group beliefs regarding the social hierarchy.
There are a number of reasons why it is important to advance our understanding of status
as an unstable, dynamic construct arising from subjective evaluations. Our treatment of status as
globally understood and recognized may lead us to make inaccurate predictions about how
people react (or fail to react) to status. That is, we may overestimate the reach of status
understandings and the benefits conferred to those who are considered high status in certain
contexts, but not all. More specifically, we may overlook the extent to which status resides in the
realm of subjective evaluations and individual beliefs that may or may not be shared or
transferred to others. Further, by assuming that status is accepted and recognized by all, we run
the risk of oversimplifying the dynamic between people’s self-evaluations and their judgments of
others. In other words, we fail to account for the relational nature of status effects, and overlook
the importance of subjective evaluative processes that are necessary to facilitate status-driven
outcomes. That is, by not fully appreciating the mechanisms that underlie status, we may
mistakenly adapt a narrow, or worse, imprecise understanding of who achieves status, who
maintains status, and how or when status is recognized or ascribed by others.
This work focuses on the phenomenon of status disagreement, or incidences where people
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have differing opinions about their respective positions within a social hierarchy. I begin by
reviewing relevant organizational research on status hierarchies and the smaller body of
emerging studies that have begun to challenge existing assumptions about status consensus.
Next, I demonstrate how this work can be linked to three primary sources of status disagreement:
1) personal motives 2) information and 3) ideals In doing so, I attempt to identify the qualities
that are expected to increase or decrease the probability of these effects. Finally, I present
propositions that outline the likely consequences of status disagreement.
The emergence of status hierarchies within groups
In order to delve into the possibilities of perceptual asymmetry in regard to status, it is useful
to consider the emergence of status by revisiting early understandings of the origins and
functions of hierarchy. Throughout time, social science research has repeatedly demonstrated
that status hierarchies emerge in all human social environments (Gruenfeld & Tiedens, 2010).
Further, when status is not formally assigned, orderings will still emerge, even when there is no
obvious differentiation between individuals (Bales, 1950; Fisek & Ofshe, 1970). Thus, it appears
that humans have a natural tendency to organize themselves into a hierarchal structure (Tiedens
& Fragale, 2003).
While status orderings are believed to be a fundamental aspect of human life, the goals for
hierarchy and mechanisms by which status emerges tend to be varied and complex. For this
reason, more than one theoretical perspective has been presented to explain the origin and
purpose of status hierarchies. This work clusters around two predominant views: the functional
perspective and the dominance perspective. By and large, the functional perspective has been the
most influential view to organizational research, demonstrating the value and utility of status for
groups (Anderson et al., 2006; Blau, 1964; Berger et al., 1980; Gruenfeld & Tiedens, 2010;
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Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Another important but less studied view, sometimes referred to as the
dominance perspective, focuses on the motives and behaviors individuals use to obtain status.
The functional perspective (or rational perspective) has long been the prevailing theoretical
lens to understanding status hierarchy within organizational behavior (Bavelas, 1960),
psychology (Thibault & Kelley, 1959), sociology (Davis & Moore, 1945) and economics (Frank,
1985). Research in this tradition relies on the assumption that status differentiation is mainly a
smooth, peaceful, cooperative process (Berger, Zelditch, & Cohen, 1972; Ridgeway, 1987).
According to this view, once group members assess the amount of relative value provided by
each person, everyone is assigned status and members organize themselves accordingly. In other
words, group members are thought to develop an implicit consensus as to which individual
characteristics are valuable and allocate status assignments based on the extent to which
individuals demonstrate these attributes (Berger, et al., 1972). It is further assumed that the
status beliefs of group members reach a point of equilibrium and ultimate consensus. In this way,
the purpose of status hierarchies is to create efficiencies and synergies that drive and sustain
optimal group performance.
Since groups include members who may or may not agree on particular goals, the best
strategies to pursue these goals, or how to execute certain tasks towards these goals, the more
specific functions of status hierarchy include 1) easing collective decision-making (e.g.,
Cartwright & Zander, 1953; Levine & Moreland, 1990; Van Vugt et al., 2008), 2) coordinating
individual behavior so that members work towards increasing the quality of group process and
outputs (Blau & Scott, 1962; Cartwright & Zander, 1953) and 3) motivating group members to
contribute by providing status-related incentives (e.g., Kerr & Tindale, 2004; Willer, 2009).
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First, status hierarchies are thought to aid in collective decision-making by giving
disproportionate control to one or a few members (Van Vugt et al., 2008). Status hierarchies are
expected to increase the quality of group decisions since individuals with high status are those
who are seen as most competent, and thus, should be the most capable of making sound
decisions on behalf of the group. In functional hierarchies, high status members are presumed to
have the most knowledge and expertise. Indeed, a number of studies have shown that groups
tend to give status to individuals who demonstrate superior abilities (for reviews, see Bass, 1981;
Driskell & Mullen, 1990, Anderson, Spataro & Flynn, 2008). Other members recognize this
status ordering by showing high status members respect by actively seeking their input, honoring
their opinions, and supporting their goals and interests. Status-based interactions are a reflection
and re-enactment of these shared group beliefs.
Second, status hierarchies are expected to facilitate coordination by reducing conflict and
guiding communication. In a group where all members have conflicting ideas, speak at once, and
attempt to direct the behaviors of others, coordination suffers. Status hierarchies solve the
problem of “too many cooks in the kitchen” by designating group leaders, who are allowed to
direct others’ actions and make final decisions on the group’s behalf, while lower status
members are expected to listen and defer to others (Bales et al., 1951; Berger et al., 1980;
Keltner et al., 2003). Hierarchies are also thought to provide the structure and direction for
information flow. In the prototypical pyramid, information travels up to group leaders, who then
integrate this information and make decisions, which in turn, travel down and throughout the
hierarchy (Arrow, 1974; Bavelas, 1950; Leavitt, 2005). At the same time, research has produced
mixed findings in regard to whether status hierarchies facilitate or hinder group process
efficiencies. For example, research has shown that status may also prevent upward
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communication when team members remain silent to leaders to avoid negative judgment, blame,
or other repercussions (Roberts & O’Reilly, 1974).
Finally, status hierarchies are thought to motivate individuals to contribute to the group by
offering social, material, and psychological incentives for those who achieve high status (Blau,
1964; Willer, 2009). Group members who are perceived to provide the most value to the group
are rewarded with greater ranking and accompanying respect and admiration, autonomy, power,
and social support. For these reasons, recent work has likened the functional perspective of status
to the idea of meritocracy (Anderson & Kennedy, 2012). For example, high status actors have
the freedom and autonomy to make decisions and act in accordance to their own will, in contrast
to low status actors who are expected to comply with the decisions of others, and may have less
of a say in the work tasks they must complete. Moreover, in the end, those who are high status
may assume a greater share of credit for the group’s success. Together, such status related
rewards are thought to encourage group members to demonstrate their competence and value to
the group.
On the other hand, the dominance theory of status hierarchies tends to characterize the
process of status allocation as a domain marked by conflict and competition, rather than peace,
cooperation, and rational judgment (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Lee & Ofshe, 1981; Mazur,
1985). According to this view, members within a given group will pit themselves against each
other through demonstrations of assertive and sometimes manipulative behaviors in a battle for
status during what is referred to as a dominance contest. Early studies by Mazur and colleagues
(1985; Mazur & Booth, 1998) assert that while human hierarchies may be unique in some ways,
status hierarchies retain important similarities across all animal species. A critical component of
this model is that individual actors within a hierarchy engage in dominance acts, or behavior to
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signal a claim on status they already possess or intend to take away from others (Mazur, 1989).
Among humans, these behaviors typically include gestures such as tall, erect posture, wide
stances, assertive facial expressions, or “stare downs” (Cheng et al., 2013, Henrich and GilWhite, 2001, Rosa and Mazur, 1987). In a seminal piece of sociological work, Whyte (1992)
focuses on status conflicts among members of street gangs, or what he calls “honor societies.”
Some early organizational research follows in this tradition. For example, negotiated order
theory argues that social order undergoes a process of constant (re) construction as members
battle for status and assess, punish, or reward one another based on the extent to which traits and
behaviors meet shared standards of legitimacy (Strauss et al., 1963).
Whereas status may consist of different values across different situations, groups tend to
value two main individual level characteristics. First, individuals must appear to possess
competencies that are at the core of group’s goals and challenges (Driskell & Mullen, 1990;
Ridgeway, 1987). Second, individuals must be evaluated as having collective interests, or be
willing to use their capabilities to help others and contribute to the group’s success as a whole
(Ridgeway, 1982; Willer, 2009). While the functional perspective explains why groups are
concerned with individual competencies, it does not fully account for how individuals reconcile
group goals with personal status-based rewards. Nor does it account for status hierarchies that do
not reflect competence, as in cases where overconfident but underskilled members are rewarded
with status (Anderson, Brion, Moore & Kennedy, 2012). On the other hand, the overt
confrontation and aggression portrayed by the dominance perspective is less realistic within
work groups, since such displays violate group values and expectations towards collective
interests (Ridgeway, 1987).
Further, the tension between these theoretical perspectives spills over into controversy

15

regarding whether status hierarchies facilitate or hinder group effectiveness. Empirical studies on
this topic have produced mixed findings. The ubiquity of status hierarchies is often taken as
evidence for its effectiveness for social functioning. Some empirical research supports this view,
arguing that hierarchy is especially beneficial for groups with a high level of interdependence
(Ronay, Greenaway, Anicich, and Galinsky, 2012). However, other research has found that
inequality reduces group functioning and performance. For instance, in cases where group
members contribute equally to discussion, we observe improved group performance (Woolley,
Chabris, Pentland, Hashmi, & Malone, 2010). Moreover, inequality in pay has been shown to
increase organizational turnover (Wade, O’Reilly, & Pollock, 2006), and reduce individual
performance in Major League Baseball (Bloom, 1999). Hierarchical differences have also been
shown to hamper knowledge sharing, experimentation, and prioritizing shared goals, all of which
hinder group learning (Bunderson and Reagans, 2011). This paper will offer an additional
explanation, suggesting that these empirical inconsistencies are likely in part due to undetected
disagreement among group members as to who should be allocated high versus low status.
What is Status Disagreement?
A modest group of studies provide empirical evidence to support the view that status
assignments do not always reach consensus. An early study on group status focused on
communication patterns discovered relatively stable inequalities between members in terms of
who initiated and received messages, suggesting social consensus (Bales et al., 1951). Yet, a
follow up study on explicit measures of individuals’ private perceptions found that consensus
versus disagreement varied between groups, and thus, had important implications for group
functioning (Heinicke and Bales, 1953). Since then, there has been little continued discussion of
status disagreement. Instead the focus in this area has been on the emergence of significant
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agreement in status perceptions (e.g., Anderson and Kilduff, 2009; Berger et al., 1972, 1980),
even though perfect consensus is rare and high levels of group agreement may exist even in cases
of disagreement between individuals (Kilduff, Willer & Anderson, 2016).
Additional studies provide indirect support for the notion that status disagreement is common
and likely has an important effect on group outcomes. For instance, team members have been
shown to have differing perceptions of each other’s levels of expertise (Gardner & Kwan, 2012).
Further, increasing attention has been placed on perceptual disagreement within groups along
dimensions such as conflict (Jehn, Rispens, & Thatcher, 2010) and trust (De Jong & Dirks,
2012). Such disagreement has been linked to a number of significant consequences, such as
performance loss, decreases in team commitment, and a withdrawal of contributions (Kilduff et
al., 2016). Together, these points suggest that we stand to make important theoretical advances
by revisiting our assumption of consensus within work teams.
Moreover, recent research has found that conflict that emerges over status disagreements has
an independent effect that is stronger and more detrimental to group performance than other
types of conflict, including relationship, process, and task conflict (Bendersky & Hays, 2012).
Other studies have focused directly on the individual behavior of those engaged in explicit
competition over status. For instance, research focused on Wall Street sell-side equity analysts
found that groups including several high-achieving individuals suffered from declines in team
performance (Groysberg, Polzer, & Elfenbein, 2012). These studies suggest that when too many
individuals within a team perceive themselves as high status, group processes are interrupted and
team performance suffers. In other words, overt disagreement diverts energy and effort towards
conflict and away from group productivity (Bendersky & Hays, 2012). Whereas these studies
rely on the presumption of open and explicit status contests, this work expands the domain of
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status disagreement in line with Kilduff and colleagues (2016) to suggest that divergence in
individuals’ private but uncontested perceptions may be equally detrimental to group
functioning. Using the aforementioned studies as a building block for the current research, I
elaborate on the specific sources of status disagreement and expand the range of potential
consequences for this phenomenon.
According to the functional perspective of status outlined above, status understandings
represent a foundational organizing framework for group members. That is, group members rely
on their own status understandings to coordinate themselves and interact effectively with each
other. In this way, status orderings work to solve the problem of collective decision making,
improve the quality of group decisions, and incentivize members to put their best foot forward in
response to the promise of status-related rewards. If members within a team attempt to formulate
status perceptions about one another and this process does not reach a point of agreement, it
stands to reason that groups experience lower levels of effectiveness. This disagreement may
happen both within and outside of individuals’ awareness, however, in both cases, it is expected
that groups will experience an adverse impact on functioning and performance. That is, status
disagreement may emerge from the same negative processes it perpetuates: segmented,
uncoordinated decision-making, low quality decisions, and independent, or selfish (rather than
group motivated) motives. Further, since individuals have a natural inclination to arrange
themselves according to a status hierarchy, their attempts at creating order have deeper and more
far-reaching implications than other forms of disagreement.
More recently, Kilduff and colleagues (2016) have delineated between three types of status
disagreement: 1) upward disagreement, which occurs when two group members both believe
they rank above the other in a status hierarchy, 2) downward disagreement, which occurs when
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two group members both believe they rank below the other in the group’s hierarchy, and 3)
third-party disagreement, when two group members disagree about the relative position of one
of the other group members (who is uninvolved in the disagreement). Since low status positions
are comparatively less desirable, this work argues that upward disagreement is the most
prevalent and harmful type of disagreement. Further, disagreement over high status positions is
likely to be more detrimental to group functioning, since high status members are assigned
greater expectations and responsibilities for the group.
However, there are also particular scenarios that may not be captured by these categories, but
should have detrimental effects at both individual and group level analysis. That is, there are
likely combinations of both third-party disagreement and upward agreement, or vice versa.
Further, downward disagreement may also complicate these effects. For example, Steven might
think that she’s higher status than both Bob and Charlie, which both Bob and Charlie agree with.
She also may think that Bob is higher status than Charlie, which both Bob and Charlie disagree
with. These mis-matched perceptions will likely lead to a number of important effects. However,
our current theoretical understanding of status disagreement remains unclear about how to
account for the combined effects of perceptual asymmetry.
For the purpose of this paper, I will take a broader view to focus on the antecedents,
moderators, and outcomes of both dyadic and third-party status disagreement. Since the sources
of status disagreement may be varied and complex, it seems most appropriate to revisit our
assumptions regarding how status perceptions emerge in the first place and how they are shared
within groups in the workplace.
The Potential Sources of Status Disagreement
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I propose that status consensus is not as seamless as it may appear, and that status
disagreement, incidences where people disagree about their standing and the position of others
within a hierarchy, are relatively common. The presumption of status consensus represents
several problems. First, there is a common knowledge problem, or the issue that it is impossible
for more than one individual to have an identical experience or perception of the world. This
problem obstructs the capability of groups to organize themselves on the basis of common
understandings. Second, there is the issue of social evaluation, or the subjective process of
prioritizing shared goals and values. Members within any given group likely have varying
opinions as to how to approach a task, this results in divergent perceptions about which group
members’ skills are most useful and valuable. Finally, there is the issue of mixed motives. That
is, it is likely that certain individuals will strive to attain status within a group, even if others
have superior skills that are better suited for group success.
These problems are grouped into three main categories that carry distinct themes but intersect
and overlap: 1) personal motives, 2) ideals, and, 3) information. It is proposed that variation
among individuals within these categories will lead to the emergence of status disagreement.
First, group members do not typically have access to objective information about each other’s
level of knowledge, skills and abilities. To the extent that individuals are unfamiliar with one
another, this means they must rely on superficial cues (e.g., personality perceptions). For
example, the quiet behavior of an introverted colleague may be interpreted as a sign of lack of
knowledge or things to contribute by some group members, whereas others may have past
experience and direct observation of the same introvert’s high level of skill and expertise.
Second, group members may have varying opinions as to which skills and individual
characteristics are most valuable to the group’s success. For example, whereas highly tenured
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members might believe that seniority is most essential for team productivity, others with industry
experience might favor specialized knowledge. Finally, since status is associated with certain
benefits, it is likely that some individuals will be motivated to enhance their own contributions
while demeaning the value of others in order to secure personal rewards. These behaviors may be
convincing to discerning observers but not others, leading to variation in status perceptions.
An integration of social information processing theory and self-serving bias literature allows
us to make certain predictions about when status disagreements are most likely to emerge. First,
self-serving bias, or the perceptual tendency to hold views that enhance one’s self-esteem, helps
explain the role of personal motives in formulating status perceptions. Further, according to
literature on social information processing, social information influences human judgment,
thought, and action when the information is clear and easy to understand (Daft & Lengel, 1984;
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), the salience and visibility of the information is high (Fiske, Kenny, &
Taylor, 1982), and the information is credible. I argue that situational features often determine
the clarity and visibility of information, whereas the credibility of information is determined
through a valuation process related to certain ideals.
Personal Motives
The desire for status is an important human motive (Anderson, Hildreth & Howland, 2015).
As a representation of a person’s position within a social ranking system, social status is a
meaningful benchmark people use to evaluate their own self-worth and social esteem. Further, a
well-established tenet in our understanding of human behavior is that people are fundamentally
motivated by self-interest (Schwartz, 1987). In many organizational settings, status comes with a
range of benefits, including instrumental rewards such as promotions, interpersonal rewards such
as deference, or image-based rewards such as prestige (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). To the extent
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that individuals believe they deserve such rewards or see an opportunity to make a claim to
valuable resources, they are expected to be motivated to compete to secure a position at the top
of the status hierarchy. I discuss how individual characteristics such as dominance, cultural
values such as individualism, and situational factors such as competition are each expected to
amplify self-interest and increase the likelihood that individuals may misperceive their social
standing or act in a way that causes disagreement in the eyes of others.
A substantial body of work on motivated perception (e.g., Kunda, 1990, Taylor & Brown,
1988), suggests that certain individuals may have a tendency to perceive themselves as higher in
status than others. In other words, such individuals might possess inflated perceptions of the
value of their own characteristics, skills, and knowledge as a result of self-serving biases. It
follows that they may be more attentive to their own contributions to the group, and value their
own work above others (Epley et al., 2000). Empirical evidence supports this view, with studies
showing that individuals sometimes inflate the importance of their specific attributes to attain
higher status (Owens & Sutton, 2012). For example, a group member may announce and frame
the group needs according to what they believe is their strongest asset. Building on past findings,
I describe how particular individual traits are closely linked to status striving motives. Next, I
discuss the less explored but likely possibility that situational characteristics may also fuel this
psychological mechanism.
Dominance. High levels of dominance within a group are likely to strengthen the
relationship between self-interest and status disagreement. When individuals are high on trait
dominance, they are more likely to think and act in self-interested ways. That is, trait dominance
makes individuals more vulnerable to self-serving biases. In turn, this is likely to lead to status
disagreement, or cases when individuals within a dyad both think of themselves as higher status
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than the other. Studies have repeatedly found that individual characteristics are related to status
striving behaviors. A cumulative analysis of 85 years of research shows that the personality trait
dominance is the strongest predictor of who emerges as a leader within a group, above any other
individual factor taken into consideration, including intelligence (Cummins, 2015). Trait
dominance is explained as a preference for having authority over others and a tendency towards
assertive behavior. In one study, individuals who scored high on dominance were rated as more
competent by their teammates, which led them to be assigned higher relative status and influence
compared to others (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). Notably, this effect occurred despite the fact
that dominant individuals were actually no more competent than less dominant others, as evinced
by standardized test scores and performance on group tasks. This effect was determined to occur
based on the increased confidence conveyed by dominant individuals through behaviors such as
taking the initiative to actively suggest answers and volunteering information believed to be
relevant to problem solving tasks (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). More recently, Kilduff and
colleagues (2016) have demonstrated a link between dominance and status disagreement.
However, missing from existing research is an account of what happens when several members
of a group are high on dominance. That is, we are uncertain as to whether or not dominance itself
creates status disagreement, or if it is configural dominance that leads to perceptual variation. I
posit that the higher the levels of dominance within a group, the more individuals will be
engaged in status striving, which will ultimately create high levels of group-level status
disagreement.
Proposition 1a: The level of individual trait dominance within a group is positively
related to group-level status disagreement, such that the greater the number of dominant
individuals, the higher the level of status disagreement.
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Cultural Orientation. Cultural orientation influences status is many ways. In addition to
informing the valuation system used to evaluate and assign status (Torelli et al., 2014), research
suggests that the meaning of status is qualitatively different across cultures, with individualists
viewing status as a means to advance their own self-interest, and collectivists viewing status as a
means through which to support the interests of others (Torelli & Shavitt, 2010). It follows that
across cultures, people report different levels of motivation to achieve status and commit effort
to making their status known to others.
Whereas individualistic cultures are characterized by independent self-construal and
social competition, collectivistic cultures are more likely to nurture ideals and values that relate
to interdependence and collaboration. Building on these common understandings of cultural
differences, researchers have found that individualists are more likely to integrate status into
their own self-concept, whereas collectivists are more likely to see status as a social role. That is,
individualists are more likely to attribute their social standing to their own notions of individual
superiority. On the other hand, collectivists are more likely to see their status position as a
reflection of their responsibility towards others. In this way, they see their status position as
having relational rather than personal implications. Since individualists take status rankings more
personally than collectivists, it is more likely that status disagreements will arise between two
individualists. From a group-level perspective, it follows that the more individualists there are
within a group, the greater the number of potential status disagreements.
Proposition 1b: The level of individualism within a group is positively related to grouplevel status disagreement, such that the greater the number of individualist (vs.
collectivist) group members, the higher the level of status disagreement.
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Fixed Pie Perceptions. In addition to individual characteristics, situational factors are
expected to contribute to the incidence of self-interested motives. It is expected that high levels
of perceived competition within a group will strengthen the relationship between self-interest and
status disagreement. A cognitive bias that has been explored at length within negotiations
literature is the fixed pie bias, or the belief that one’s own interests are in direct and absolute
opposition to others (De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000). While it is evident that individuals tend
to arrange themselves into similarly structured hierarchies composed of fixed rankings
(Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015), research also suggests that this bias leads to people to
lose out on potential integrative gains (Liu, Liu & Zhang, 2016). Further, the cognitive frames, or
mental models that people use to approach such situations, are not always fixed, and can even be
adjusted into “win-win” cognitive frames (Liu, Liu, Zhang, 2016). I posit when individuals have
competitive mindsets, or the perception of “fixed pie” or “winner takes all” structures, an
individual may be more inclined to view their value system as diametrically opposed to those
whose values seem to differ from their own. From this point of view, the difference between
assuming a high and low status position within a hierarchy is high stakes, since the “winner”
takes all while leaving nothing for everyone else (“losers”). Thus, individuals will be encouraged
to behave in ways that promote their own self-interest and are likely to hold onto views that
support this behavior, increasing the likelihood of status disagreement.
From a group-level perspective, it follows that those who adopt “win-win” cognitive
frames are less likely to rank themselves more highly than others within a team. Upward status
disagreement is defined as incidences when people believe themselves to be higher status than
each other. Thus, I predict that the more members who hold “fixed pie” perceptions there are
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within a group, the more likely they are to subjectively outrank each other, and thus, create status
disagreement.
Proposition 1c: The level of “fixed pie” perceptions within a group is positively related
to group-level status disagreement, such that the greater the number of individuals with
“fixed pie” perceptions, the higher the level of status disagreement.
Information
An aspect of status evaluations that is less discussed but of critical importance is the fact that
people are rarely presented with identical sets of information about their interaction partners or
their environment. Moreover, when presented with the same information, people do not always
arrive at the same conclusions. Since status orderings are context-driven, individuals’
perceptions of one another are confined to a short, narrow and idiosyncratic history of domain
specific behaviors. People also filter information through a subjective lens. For these reasons, I
suggest that variation in access to information is a relatively common feature among work
groups. Further, this variation in access to information may feed situational ambiguity that
ultimately lays the foundation for the emergence of status disagreement.
A necessary precondition for employees to reach consensus about their own and others’
social standing is the recognition and similar interpretation of certain status-based cues. That is,
individual status perceptions require that meaningful differences between members of an
aggregate be identifiable (Conway, Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996; Shils, 1965). The tendency for
individuals to seek out and interpret distinct social features as signals of competence and value
provides the basis for work on status characteristics theory. Importantly, status characteristics
provide cues that may vary to the extent to which they are 1) observable and 2) produce uniform
perceptions of competence and value across perceivers. Both aspects may create the potential for
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divergent status evaluations among members of the same group (Kilduff, Willer, and Anderson,
2016).
There is ample evidence that people rely on noisy signals of aptitude in order to determine
whose ideas or expertise are deserving of deference as the group attempts to accomplish work
related tasks (e.g., Barton & Bunderson, 2014; Joshi, 2014; Thomas-Hunt, Ogden & Neale,
2003). Scholars have highlighted that individual demographic attributes, including gender, race,
ethnicity, educational background, and tenure, function as status markers that signal competence
across a broad range of situational contexts (Shils, 1968). In turn, these characteristics predict the
level of respect received from others (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972; Bunderson, 2003; Cohen
& Zhou, 1991; Ridgeway, 1991). Status characteristics are typically split into two categories: 1)
specific cues, which include those that are directly related to the task, such as education and
tenure, and 2) diffuse cues, which are characteristics that have no obvious or direct relevance to
the task, but are still believed to convey aptitude in a given domain (Banaji & Prentice, 1994;
Jackman, 1994; Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004; Ridgeway, 1991). Both diffuse and specific cues
operate in a similar manner. While specific cues give direct information about a person’s
potential aptitude in providing value to the group, diffuse cues give indirect signals, through
general expectations of competence, as to whether or a person will make valuable contributions
to the group’s success (Joshi & Knight, 2015).
Visibility and Clarity of Specific Status Cues. Whereas specific status characteristics (e.g.,
skills, expertise) are expected to produce more accurate expectations of potential value to group
members, they may also be less observable than diffuse cues (e.g., gender, age) (Bunderson and
Barton, 2011), and thus, more subject to variation in visibility and clarity (Chaiken &
Maheswaran, 1994; Fisher, Ilgen & Hoyer, 1979). There are many examples of potential
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variation in access to information brought about by the nature of tasks that may have low or high
levels of visibility. In practice, variation in visibility and clarity of specific cues creates status
inefficiencies. For instance, we might imagine an employee who is highly competent at a low
visibility task such as technical analysis, but less comfortable with a high visibility task such as
public speaking. Further, his nervousness might lead him to deliver a clumsy and confusing
presentation to colleagues, despite possessing a high level of expertise. In this case, his
competence at technical analysis may inspire confidence from group members who are familiar
with their competencies, while remaining less accessible as relevant information to others. In
another example, a manager at a retail store might make a point to post sales reports ranking
employees according to how much revenue they have generated. This should create a high level
of visibility around the employee’s salesmanship, however, it could be possible that the
employee secures sales by being deceptive to customers. Unless return rates and customer
satisfaction scores are also posted along with sales rankings, these skill deficiencies are probably
less visible to onlookers.
While not directly related to visibility, another source of variation in access to information is
disconnected membership and participation across social groups and contexts. In modern
workplaces, team membership may shift frequently and employees may be members of multiple
teams (O’Leary, Mortensen & Woolley, 2011). Thus, the issue of shifting contexts hinders the
growth of familiarity between teammates which would allow them to establish shared
perspectives on the task, goals, and each other (Wageman, Gardner, & Mortensen, 2012) The
fact that people may have membership in contexts where individuals’ skills are highlighted
influences their level of familiarity and distance from one another. For instance, legal and
medical professionals have been shown to have very different relative standings in the eyes of
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“insiders” versus “outsiders” of their career networks (Abbott, 1981). In another example, an
immigrant may have high social standing in their country of origin, but lower comparative status
in the place where they are resettling. In such cases, status understandings may diverge as the
result of access to distal versus proximal cues.
Proposition 2a: The level of visibility of work contributions within a group is negatively
related to status disagreement, such that the higher the visibility rating of members’
contributions, the lower the level of status disagreement.
A second potential issue arising from specific status characteristics (e.g., skills, expertise) is
potential variation in clarity, or ease of understanding. This is further complicated when
members of a group have different levels of knowledge and expertise. For example, a person
may have highly specialized knowledge that is at the same time invaluable to the group’s
success. It is possible that certain members will have a knowledge base that is closer to the
person in question. In this case, these members might act as intermediaries that are able to assess
the value of a team member, however, other members might be more doubtful of this person’s
value, or even misattribute their skills to a colleague who is better at communication.
Indeed, there is a body of research that examines the elaboration of task-relevant information as a
team-level resource (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004). According to this view, elaboration of
information includes the exchange and integration of ideas and knowledge relevant to the task.
However, since expertise is by definition a specialized level of knowledge and understanding, it
may not easily be understood or appreciated by others within a group. It follows that whereas
some group members might see the value in a particular skill set, others might have a weaker
understanding, and thus, devalue the contributions that they fail to understand. For these reasons,
I posit that the clarity of information in the eyes of others is a likely source of status
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disagreement.
Proposition 2b: The level of clarity of work contributions within a group is negatively related
to status disagreement, such that the higher the group-level clarity ratings of members’
contributions, the lower the level of status disagreement.
Visibility of Diffuse Status Cues. In contrast to specific characteristics related to knowledge
and expertise, diffuse status characteristics such as age, race and gender, are easily observable.
People tend to use cognitive shortcuts to make inferences about others, otherwise referred to as
stereotypes. In some cases, these stereotypes are used because of a lack of information, whereas
other times, stereotypes assist in the simplification of information. A long history of research on
status expectations in small groups has found that certain social characteristics that are imbued
with societal value, such as gender and race, influence the contributions of group members as
well as the extent to which these contributions are valued (Ridgeway, 1987; Thomas-Hunt et al.,
2003). At the societal level, men are generally perceived as having higher levels of competence
than women and thus deserving of higher relative status (Ridgeway, 2001). These findings
extend to racial differences, as evinced by studies showing that White employees are viewed as
more highly effective and are also evaluated as having more leadership potential than nonWhites (Rosette, Phillips, & Leonardelli, 2008). Since diffuse status characteristics tend to be
highly observable cues, it is likely that people will rely more heavily on diffuse status
characteristics in order to infer the competence and value possessed by group members,
especially in ambiguous situations. This possibility is discussed further in later sections related to
legitimacy and ideals.
Contextual Ambiguity. While the visibility and clarity of status cues creates transparency
and consistency regarding how individuals see themselves and how they are viewed within a
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particular social context, situational factors might also interrupt the way that these cues are
applied. That is, in contexts that lack objective performance metrics, it may be highly unclear
which individual contributions or capabilities are most crucial for success. Whereas some fields
are characterized by intangible skills such as knowledge work, others might be marked by rapid
change, such as technology. In both cases, it may difficult to “stay ahead of the curve” as
performance standards are often elusive. Similarly, firms or groups may employ multiple
strategies in order to manage high levels of uncertainty. For example, the field of higher
education is driven by both academic and athletic status rankings (Lifschitz et al., 2011), but it is
arguably more difficult to disentangle the specific influence of each. Yet, for schools with high
status, both dimensions are typically treated as an opportunity to capitalize on a competitive
advantage.
Proposition 2c: The level of contextual ambiguity within a group is positively related to
status disagreement, such that the higher the level of group contextual ambiguity, the higher
the level of status disagreement.
Differences in information are expected to be especially common in early stages of group
formation and highly influential to status orderings. While the functional theory of status
hierarchies predicts that groups engage in re-shuffling as they become more familiar with each
other’s value and contributions to the group, empirical evidence does not support this view.
Instead, studies suggest that status hierarchies are established early and are highly resistance to
change, demonstrating a hardening effect (Anderson & Kilduff, 2010). This paper provides an
additional perspective to this effect, suggesting that it is people’s subjective perceptions of the
status hierarchy that develop early and show little signs of adjustment as time goes on. While not
always shared with others, these perceptions provide the basis for corresponding behavior. Thus,
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it is expected that to the extent that variation in access to information and the interpretation of
status cues influences status beliefs during the early stages of group formation, such beliefs are
likely to become formative as the group reaches maturity. Thus, it is expected that the effects of
differential access to information are especially common when members are becoming
acquainted with one another as members of the same group, and increase in salience as the group
reaches maturity.
Based on previous discussion, I expect that status disagreement, or instances wherein two
people within a team both perceive themselves as having higher status than the other, are likely
to emerge in conditions where there is a high level of variation in access to social information
and clarity of social information. Unsurprisingly, low levels of familiarity and clarity regarding
others’ skill set within a group is expected to create a moderate level of status disagreement due
to increased ambiguity. However, this effect should be significantly exacerbated by group
variation, wherein some group members have high levels of familiarity or clarity, and other
group members report relatively low levels of these constructs.
Ideals
While the problem of common knowledge is one hurdle, it is not the only issue that
hinders status consensus. Even if individual members have access to a similar set of information
and reach a common understanding, they may develop inconsistent interpretations as to the
priority of each others’ skill set, and thus, have conflicting views as to whose skills provide the
group the highest level of value. Unlike the issue of access to information that is clear and easy
to understand, this scenario involves differing opinions as to the type of skills and contributions
that should be prioritized in order to achieve group success. It follows that disagreement of this
kind will lead to dissensus regarding who belongs at the top and bottom of the social hierarchy.
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Here, I refer to conflicting opinions regarding which dimensions should be used to assign status
as variation in valuation criteria, or subjective ideals. Since the issue of conflicting ideals
emerges from social interaction, these propositions are expected to occur at the group level.
Heterogeneity. There are a number of reasons why people within the same group might
have differing opinions about which skills or competencies are most important for group
performance. Building on prior research, I suggest that highly diverse groups, comprised of
members from different backgrounds, experiences, and skill sets are likely to develop unique
value systems. In particular, I argue that teams characterized by high levels of within-group
dissimilarity are likely to possess divergent beliefs about which behaviors and characteristics
help fuel group processes and ultimately lead to high performance outcomes (Van Knippenberg,
De Dreu, & Homan, 2004; Kirkman & Shapiro, 2005). In order to illuminate the role of
heterogeneity in the formulation of divergent status evaluations, I will turn to a discussion of
legitimacy.
Legitimacy. As previously discussed, social information processing theory posits that social
information is most influential not only when information is observable and clear, but also when
the information is credible (Daft & Lengel, 1984; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Fisher, Ilgen &
Hoyer, 1979). At the intersection of external information and internal values, is the sociocognitive process that involves an assessment of credibility, or validity, between the two. In
order to elaborate on the credibility criteria, it is useful to refer to the broad literature on
legitimacy (Ridgeway, 2001). Within the sociological tradition, legitimacy is a term used to
describe how actors are evaluated based on their consistency with cultural beliefs, norms, and
values. This evaluative process includes both a 1) cognitive dimension that construes actors
based on valid, seemingly objective, characteristics, and a 2) prescriptive component that
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consists of whether an actor’s characteristics or behavior is perceived as morally right. Most of
the research in this area focuses on explaining why demographic characteristics are associated
with status expectations that vary for members of different groups (Johnson et al., 2006;
Ridgeway, 2001). It is posited here that a high level of heterogeneity within groups is associated
with the enactment of different schemas of legitimacy, and thus, is likely to create status
disagreement.
There is plenty of evidence to suggest that heterogeneity in members’ status characteristics
will spur differences in the amount of value and influence members’ are assumed to possess
within groups (Johnson et al., 2006). More specifically, group members with diffuse status
advantages (e.g., White men) are more likely to become assertive and influential in decisions and
become leaders than members with diffuse status disadvantages (e.g., Black women) (Johnson et
al., 2006). Yet this consequence is inefficient since members who are status advantaged are not
always the same members who are in fact more competent and influential (Weber & Foschi,
1988, Wagner & Berger, 2002). Of course, exceptions exist when women or minority employees
become leaders as a result of other characteristics related to performance expectations, such as
seniority or expertise. However, studies show that those whose status characteristics are
inconsistent with these titles are more likely to face resistance from subordinates (e.g., Eagly &
Karau, 2002). In this case, widespread status-related beliefs created at the societal level have
accumulated comparatively higher levels of cultural support (i.e., authorization and
endorsement) for those with diffuse status advantages in comparison to those with diffuse status
disadvantages (Cornell & Ridgeway, 2003). Typically, individuals such as these find themselves
with weaker levels of within-group endorsement and normative expectations for compliance.

34

It follows that heterogeneous groups are more likely to include individuals whose diffuse
status characteristics (e.g., gender, race) are incongruent with their specific status characteristics
(e.g., skills and expertise). That is, diverse groups are likely to include members with high levels
of competence and expertise but are status disadvantaged according to greater society. Since
diffuse status characteristics are more observable than the latter, however, it is likely that some
group members may mistakenly rely on these cues in order to assign colleagues’ with lower
relative status. At the same time, it is possible that status disadvantaged individuals may
demonstrate their skills while onlookers discount their competencies due to cognitively
perceived invalidity (e.g., Eagley & Karau, 2002).
Further, there is evidence that cultural values influence how people perceive status. This
work has direct implications for variation for the prescriptive component of legitimacy, or the
extent to which status is associated with what is morally right. For example, whereas those from
individualistic cultures have been shown to value demonstrations of competence and dominance,
those from collectivist cultures tend to value displays of helping and generosity (Torelli et al.,
2014). In one study, Americans were less likely than Polish individuals to comply with a request
from a leader with low competence, whereas Polish individuals were less likely to comply with a
request from a leader without relational skills (Wosinska, et al., 2009; see Leslie and Gelfand,
2011 for a review of similar findings). This suggests that individuals evaluate, recognize, and
react to the status of others based on a set of values that varies between individuals. I predict
that differences in ideals within a group are applied according to two primary dimensions of
evaluative legitimacy, including prescriptive and cognitive lenses.
Proposition 3a: The level of heterogeneity within a group in terms of both personal and
skill-based characteristics is positively related to status disagreement, such that the
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higher the level of heterogeneity, the higher the level of status disagreement. .
Proposition 3b: The level of evaluative legitimacy of others’ skills within a group is
negatively related to status disagreement, such that the higher the level of evaluative
legitimacy, the lower the level of status disagreement.
The topic of status disagreement is just beginning to emerge as a possibility within work
groups. However, the previous discussion suggests that it is a characteristic that is likely
frequently overlooked, as illustrated by the fact that potential drivers are varied and wideranging. I have grouped the origins of status disagreement into three primary dimensions that are
expected to vary in the degree to which they are shared: information, ideals, and self-interest.
These dimensions are conceptualized as closely related but distinct approaches to the
phenomenon of status disagreement. Further, while this work is meant to provide an overview of
likely effects, it is possible that there are additional sources of status disagreement that have not
yet been considered.
The Consequences of Status Disagreement
The concept of status disagreement in and of itself departs from our traditional understanding
of status hierarchy. As such, it is a construct that has escaped the attention of most researchers,
but necessarily influences the dynamics and consequences of status within workgroups and
organizations. While status disagreement within groups may sometimes remain undetected, I
argue that it nonetheless produces important consequences for individuals and workgroups. In
the following sections, I will outline how perceptual status disagreement may spur a series of
negative experiences for individuals that likely interrupt the development and maintenance of
group processes and ultimately diminish group performance.
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As mentioned, we are only beginning to understand the occurrence and outcomes of status
disagreement. While certain scholars have shown that explicit team disagreement over status
diverts energy and effort towards conflict and away from group productivity (Bendersky & Hays,
2012; Groysenberg, Polzer & Elfenbein, 2012), more recent work suggests that private status
disagreement operates instead through another mechanism: reduced motivation (Kilduff et al.,
2016). In turn, this decline in motivation leads to withdrawal of contributions and reduced group
performance. These studies suggest that when too many individuals within a group perceive
themselves as high status, group processes are interrupted and performance suffers. While such
studies offer important findings for our treatment of status disagreement, they do not elaborate
on the specific reasons why group members lose motivation or choose to engage in conflict.
Further, scholars have only recently begun to move beyond the presumption of open and explicit
status contests to explore the effects of perceptions of status that might diverge privately (Kilduff
et al., 2016). The present work will attempt to add precision and robustness to extant findings by
suggesting that private status disagreement likely leads to a broad range of psychological and
affective states, with a complex range of consequences for individuals and groups.

Individual Outcomes
While high status appears to be tied to lower levels of baseline levels of negative affect
and stress, those who see themselves as high status also tend to respond to acute status threats
more intensely than others (Gruenfeld & Tiedens, 2010). For example, in an experiment where
high status participants were asked to complete challenging speech and arithmetic tasks in front
of an audience, they found that those who had higher self-reported levels of status (reported
being more “respected”, “esteemed,” and “admired” than others) had the most elevated levels of
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physiological stress response to this task and perceived social evaluative threat (Gruenfeld &
Tiedens, 2010). One explanation for this effect is that those who see themselves as high status
tend to place higher value on this hierarchical position than others. In another example, when
Blader and Chen (2012) randomly assigned participants to a high status negotiation role,
participants became increasingly concerned with whether or not their negotiation partner treated
them with respect. Pettit, Yong, and Sparro (2010) also conclude that people are more concerned
with losing status than possible gains to status. These findings suggest that those who perceive
themselves as high status hold certain standards and expectations that others recognize them as
such. When these expectations are not met, as is predicted in the case of status disagreement, I
argue that individuals are more likely to experience feelings of threat and low levels of control.
Status orderings guide patterns of behavioral interaction at a micro-level, such that higher
status individuals are shown signs of deference and respect. However, in cases of status
disagreement, wherein two individuals both perceive themselves to be higher status than the
other, individuals’ expectations for how others should treat them are likely unmet. That is, a
person who views themselves as high status may find that their interaction partners withhold acts
of deference, failing to treat them in the way they feel they deserve. These interaction patterns
might include behaviors such as ignoring their suggestions, interrupting or challenging their
opinion, offering unsolicited guidance, or failing to acknowledge or praise their contributions. At
a basic level, incongruence between a person’s self-views and how their colleagues perceive
them can negatively affect one’s feelings of coherence and control (Polzer, Milton & Swann,
2002). Conflicting status expectations should exacerbate this effect, as evinced by research on
dominance complementarity, which finds that people are most comfortable with interaction
partners who complement, rather than mimic, their levels of dominance behavior (Tiedens and
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Fragale, 2003, Tiedens et al., 2007). In addition to the discomfort of a one-time offense, the fact
that interaction partners have differing perceptions of one another’s status suggests that a
dynamic of conflicting expectations may become a frequent, if not normative aspect of the
relationship.
Proposition 4a: Status disagreement is positively related to individual perceptions of
personal threat.
Further, individuals who perceive their own relative value and contributions as relatively
higher than others, but do not experience dyadic affirmations of this view are likely uncertain of
their role within the group. Role ambiguity occurs when an individual does not understand his or
her responsibilities and goals for the job (Sawyer, 1992). A common version of role ambiguity
arises when individuals are uncertain of their boundaries, leading to anxiety. For example, a
person might consider herself to be an expert on a given topic, but find that certain group
members do not follow their guidance on a relevant task. Not only will this experience be
threatening to self-perceptions of status, but it will also challenge how a person categorizes his or
her unique contribution to others. This is expected to lead to role ambiguity, and a perceived lack
of control over the behavior of others and their future within the workplace (Ashford et al.,
1989). Moreover, this experience of role ambiguity as an outcome of status disagreement is
unique from other forms of role conflict in that status disagreement necessarily involves the
perceived value and worth of an individual in the eyes of his or her teammates. In this way,
conflict and ambiguity does not arise from differences alone, but also from the way in which
individuals value these differences. Further, judgements of this type involve a person making
self-evaluations in relation to others. That is, a person may believe that they are high status, and
this belief by definition might imply that they perceive others as low status, or beneath them. In
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instances of disagreement, it follows that this personal belief of worth may remain unvalidated
by the actions, values, and behaviors of others.
Proposition 4b: Status disagreement is positively related to individual perceptions of role
ambiguity.
Proposition 4c: Status disagreement is negatively related to individual perceptions of
control.
Beyond the experience of personal offense, research from the justice literature suggests that
individuals attend to fairness and justice information in order to affirm their value and belonging
to the group. In instances where group members feel disrespected by their peers, they may
retaliate. This retaliation can be overt, as when members engage in open challenges or attacks
against one another (Bendersky and Hays, 2012). However, retaliation may also take on a more
subtle form, as when members withhold task contributions and become unwilling to comply with
collective goals (Kilduff et al., 2016). In both cases, it is expected that the feelings of group
commitment will decline since members’ expectations are unmet or violated through social
interactions. Groups perform at their peak level when all involved behave as members of a
group, rather than as distinct individuals (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher
& Wetherell, 1987). However, if group members receive social information that they feel
violates their own perceptions of self-concept, they will engage in either individualist or
collective coping strategies. In the case of status disagreement, since people rate themselves
more highly than at least one another group member, it is expected that this experience will lead
to lower levels of group identification.
Proposition 4d: Status disagreement is negatively related to individual perceptions of group
identification.
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Group Outcomes
Status disagreements have unique implications for groups, since they necessarily implicate
all members of a given hierarchy. Holding the behavior of other group members equal, if two
members of a group both perceive themselves as having higher status than the other, they may
read the behavior of the other person as a potential threat to their position. Thus, they may be
more likely to engage in self-interested behaviors in order to preserve their own perception of
self-dignity and stature, even to the detriment of the group. A handful of studies have suggested
that explicit status disagreements inhibit group functioning in at least one critical manner, that is,
the reduction of information sharing (Bendersky & Hays, 2012). Group members engaged in
status disagreements tend to withdraw their contributions to the team, which in turn, reduces
team performance (Kilduff & Anderson, 2016). Thus, status disagreements can be harmful not
only for those directly involved, but other group members as well.
There are a few potential ways that status disagreement might hamper group level outcomes.
A closely related stream of research on transactional memory systems suggests that individuals
within a group function best when they are aware of each other’s potential and actual skill set
and contributions to group tasks (Wegner, 1987; Brandon & Hollingshead, 2004). However,
status understandings move beyond the location of differences since status is an indicator of
personal worth and value relative to others within a given team. Indeed, scholars have
theoretically and empirically demonstrated that disputes over status have a stronger negative
impact on the group than task, relationship, or process conflicts, since they have long term
implications, include the participation of bystanders and allies, and involve distributive
outcomes, or win-lose situations (Bendersky & Hays, 2011). First, research on both role theory
and status hierarchies suggests that patterns of interaction based on status differentiations are
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cumulative, and past dynamics are likely to set the tone for future behaviors. For example, if
Jack interrupts Steven and effectively silences his contribution, or takes credit for his idea and is
acknowledged by other group members, it is likely that in the future, the group will solicit the
opinion of Jack before they ask Steven to contribute. However, if Steven perceives his status to
be higher than Jack then he may challenge his contributions rather than defer to him. Further,
according to the functional perspective, status hierarchies serve the purpose of organizing
members in a way that facilitates efficient information and communication flows, since certain
members are expected to give direction while others carry out orders. However, if multiple
members are demonstrating leadership behaviors, by directing the tasks of others and overseeing
the quality of their performance, then other group members may become uncertain as to whose
advice to prioritize, leading to inconsistencies and process loss.
Further, the occurrence of status disagreements implies that certain members will not receive
the deference and respect they feel entitled to, which should lead to cumulative feelings of threat,
stress, and intra-group defensiveness that will likely prevent them from positively contributing to
the group. For example, employees who feel they are higher status others may discount other
members’ contributions even when they are valid. In addition, if an employee undergoes feelings
of constant threat due to a lack of deference from one or more other group members, they may
become more focused on boosting their superior image in the eyes of others and less focused on
ways to create actual value.
Proposition 5a: Status disagreement is negatively associated with group coordination.
Proposition 5b: Status disagreement is negatively associated with group process gains.
Proposition 5b: Status disagreement is negatively associated with group performance.
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The purpose of this paper was to build on recent discussions around perceptual disagreement
within groups and illuminate the various potential sources of status disagreement. This
discussion was organized around three main sources of status disagreement, including variation
within groups in information, ideals, and self-interest. Each of these categories represents
particular salient aspects of status emergence, while highlighting the possibility of perceptual
disagreement. While the traditional approach to status within organizations assumes that status
rankings are the result of shared consensus, there are many reasons, outlined here, to question
this assumption. A consideration of these dimensions may allow us to predict cases when status
hierarchies fail to provide the structure and functioning that is presumed to facilitate group
performance. In more practical terms, there are instances when employees within the same
organization may informally decide to follow different “leaders.” This work provides a number
of reasons as to how and why this occurs.
The propositions developed here should serve as motivation for future research. Thus far,
only a few researchers have tackled the complexities and outcomes of status disagreement
(Kilduff et al., 2016; Gardner 2010). However, a discussion of related research bolsters the
notion that status disagreement is more common than previously assumed. Further, the
consequences of this phenomenon influence individual-level psychological, affective, and
behavioral outcomes that ultimately impact group functioning. If dyads within a group fail to
behave on one accord, the entire group will be affected. Thus, the possibilities outlined here
deserve further examination, since they suggest a number of implications for both researchers
and practitioners within organizational behavior.
Directions for Future Research

43

While beyond the scope of the current work, future research should explore the more specific
effects of various configurations of status perceptions within groups and organizations. For
example, it would be interesting to study a dyad of individuals who are engaged in a constant
battle for status within a team that has otherwise reached a general consensus about the status
ordering. We can imagine that one person would benefit from this form of status disagreement
while the other is penalized, due to a lack of group endorsement and support. Further, it would be
interesting to study the effects of status disagreement when matched with other positional
characteristics, such as formal authority, power, or access to organizational resources and
control. Again, it is possible that one person might have enough resources to safely engage in
status disagreement, without personally experiencing negative effects. On the other hand,
engaging in status disagreement might be more costly for someone who is relatively powerless.
Further, these cases should be extended to examine their potential effects on group processes and
outcomes.
While this work is focused primarily on private perceptions of status disagreement, future
work should examine the point at which private perceptions spill over into public status
challenges. I expect that perceptions of legitimacy and in particular, the distinction between
validity (the extent to which group values match those of greater society) and endorsements (the
extent to which people believe that others’ recognize and support status assignments) play a
particularly important role in individuals’ evaluations of the risks or rewards involved in
claiming or granting status. Further, it would be interesting for future research to expand upon
the potential role of status disagreement to break down illegitimate hierarchies and rebuild those
that are better reflections of group values and perhaps more useful to group functioning.
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Additionally, future studies should examine how the degree to which the effects of status
disagreements are contingent upon levels of status. For instance, it is likely that members who
consider themselves the highest status members within a group, occupying a single position at
the top of the hierarchy, will experience more intense feelings and behaviors as a result of
upward status disagreements than those who still see themselves as high status, but relatively
further down the hierarchy.
I propose here that conflicting findings regarding the effectiveness of hierarchies are likely
due to disagreement that has thus far been overlooked. Another explanation is that hierarchy is
not as fundamental for group functioning as we have assumed. Social identity theories suggest
that people are most satisfied, committed, and engaged when they are able to maintain both
positive esteem and a high level of distinctiveness. Future studies should explore whether or not
horizontal differentiation is more effective for group functioning and performance than vertical
status hierarchy in certain situations, as posited by the contingency perspective (Anderson &
Brown, 2010) or if status orderings always reproduce themselves.
Emotions have also been shown to play a role in the transmission of status signals. For
example, the expression of anger has been associated with high status (Tiedens, 2001), which
suggests that those seeking status may strategically regulate their emotional expressions (Clark,
1990). An underexplored possibility is that people may also read and respond to emotional
displays differently. For instance, whereas some group members may have the most respect for
the person who confidently displays anger, others might lose respect for the same person by
interpreting displays of anger as a lack of control and competence in performing the group task.
The potential for emotional expressions to signal different levels of status for different perceivers
is another interesting area for future research.
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We are only beginning to grasp the occurrence and implications of cases when people
have varying opinions about who belongs at the top and bottom of a social hierarchy. This work
represents some of the first steps towards a broader consideration of the possibilities of this
phenomenon, as well as the span of impact perceptual disagreement has for both individuals and
groups within organizations. Status disagreement is a complex and nuanced subject, yet, the
implications of this topic continue to occur below the radar of much of our discussion regarding
status. As such, it is important that researchers continue to expand our understanding of status
(dis)agreement so that our collective body of knowledge may begin to account for the perceptual
intricacies that determine how status is interpreted, ascribed, and acted out within the workplace.
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ESSAY TWO:
HOW DOES IDEOLOGY INFLUENCE
STATUS PERCEPTIONS?
We are increasingly shedding light on the image of status as a battleground of conflicting
perceptions (Anderson & Kilduff, 2016). Yet, we know little about how individual differences
might influence how people attain, maintain, and ascribe social status to others (Anderson &
Kilduff, 2009; Anderson, Spataro & Flynn, 2008). This oversight presents a unique opportunity
to explore the role of ideological differences in the development of status perceptions. Social
dominance orientation (SDO) theory suggests that people generally subscribe to one of two
competing worldviews: 1) hierarachy-enhancing beliefs, which tend to tolerate and even support
hierarchy and inequality between groups, and 2) hierarchy-attenuating beliefs, which value
equality, opportunity and the distribution of resources between groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
I posit that differences along this dimension determine the degree to which individuals associate
status with principles of self-reliance, hardiness, and know-how, versus the association of status
with social responsibility, interpersonal warmth, and trust. These ideological distinctions are
important for workplace practices, since they may mean the difference between how people
within organizations are valued and ultimately, who gets hired, fired, or promoted within
organizations. Further, an enhanced understanding of ideological differences allows us to predict
how people within an organization may have diverging opinions regarding how to effectively
seek status and which behaviors provide the most value to the workplace.
Social status is defined as the prominence, respect, and esteem conferred to an actor in the
eyes of others (Ridgeway & Walker, 1995; Zelditch, 2001). Most of the research examining the
purpose and outcomes of status draws on the functional perspective (e.g., Cartwright & Zander,
1953; Levine & Moreland, 1990; Van Vugt et al., 2008). According to this perspective, people
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within a group evaluate each other according to their actual or potential usefulness in pursuing
shared goals. From this point of view, the process of status attainment and conferral is by nature
an honest and well-intentioned enterprise. That is, individuals within groups strive to assign
status to those who are most deserving. Individual actors receive high status as a reward for their
valued contributions to the group. In turn, group processes are made more efficient by
developing patterns of deference towards those that are seen as most capable of making sound
decisions. Further, status distinctions provide an incentive for actors to contribute to group
functioning and the achievement of goals. In this way, workplace evaluations become stable and
normalized since those who are accorded high status are the same people who are trusted to
make important group decisions as well as those who determine which criteria should be valued.
Since the assignment of status involves a normalized process of social evaluation, this process is
likely to impact some of the most critical decisions made within organizations, including who is
hired among a pool of potential job applicants, who is promoted to lead a team of ambitious
employees, and who is given credit for superior performance. Yet, extant research has yet to
fully consider the subjective lens through which status understandings emerge. I posit that
previous studies have oversimplified the process of social evaluation by underestimating the role
of individuals’ subjective belief systems as a determinant of cognitive judgment.
While the functional theory of status helps illuminate the cognitive and social motives that
drive the emergence of status hierarchies, this research tradition offers little explanation for the
fact that groups commonly disagree about who belongs at the top and bottom of a given status
hierarchy. We know that status disagreements are generally detrimental to group functioning
(Kilduff et al., 2016; Bendersky & Hays, 2012), however, we know less about why these
disagreements emerge in the first place. Further, this research tradition does not explain how
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status inefficiencies, or instances when status is the source of conflict, disagreement, or processbased errors, are surfaced and sustained. That is, why do characteristics that have little or no
relationship with an individual’s actual value or contributions predict status achievement? For
example, overconfident individuals have been shown to achieve status within groups, even
though their assertiveness is unrelated to their competence relative to less assertive others
(Anderson & Kennedy, 2012). Similarly, physical attractiveness shares a positive relationship
with status (Horai, Naccari & Fatoullah, 1974; Maddux & Rogers, 1980). Further, while
demographic characteristics such as race and gender are unreliable signals of individual skill,
competence, and social value, these cues reliably predict workplace evaluations (Fiske, Cuddy,
& Glick, 2007). For example, men are evaluated more positively than women, and minorities are
often judged more harshly than their counterparts.
I argue that ideological differences may help illuminate why individuals may have differing
opinions about who is most deserving of respect and esteem. Further, a greater consideration of
individual ideology may help us do more to account for the possibility of dysfunctional
hierarchies. A rich tradition of research has used social dominance orientation (SDO) to explain
how ideology influences workplace attitudes and beliefs. Social dominance orientation (SDO) is
defined as “the degree to which individuals desire and support group-based hierarchy and the
domination of ‘inferior’ groups by ‘superior’ groups” (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 48). SDO
derives from theoretical assumptions that all societies reflect group-based hierarchies, with those
at the top possessing a disproportionate amount of social value and resources, and those at the
bottom possessing a negative share of social value. Given these observations, SDO represents an
individual-level ideological belief that captures the extent to which individuals support hierarchal
orderings or are motivated to work towards greater equality. Elitists, or those who score highly
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on SDO, are referred to as hierarchy-maintaining, or enhancing, and support principles of
inequality, hierarchy, and competition. On the other hand, egalitarians, or those who score low
on SDO, are considered hierarchy-attenuating actors, who are motivated by the desire to increase
equality and expand opportunities across levels of hierarchical differentiation. The underlying
difference between these two schools of thought lie in subjective values that embrace the tenets
of self-reliance, hardiness, and know-how, vs. principles related to social respect, interpersonal
warmth, and interdependence.
Although values might shift across groups, groups members generally assign status to
individuals using two primary dimensions: competence and collective interests (Berger et al.,
1972). That is, group members, when determining an organizational hierarchy, will assess one
another on the basis of how well-equipped a person is to carry out a work task (competence), as
well as how likely they are to use their skills and expertise in service of group needs and goals
(warmth). This is a key component of the social development of status hierarchies, since a person
may be highly skilled but also prone to act in self-interested ways, at the expense of the group.
Similarly, a person may play a very active role in contributing group functioning and helping the
collective membership succeed, but lack certain skills and expertise relative to others. Indeed,
prior work has convincingly shown that task and situational factors may amplify the importance
and attention paid to each of these dimensions (Fragale, 2006; Berger, Rosenholtz & Zelditch,
1980). That is, while each dimension is important to group-based perceptions such as social
status, the salience of competence and collective interests may vary based on additional factors.
Interestingly, these dimensions map onto the rich tradition of person perception research
(Fiske, Cuddy & Glick, 2006), which provides a framework for social evaluation along the
fundamental dimensions of competence and warmth. While warmth refers to such traits as
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friendliness, kindness, and trustworthiness; competence represents such things as intelligence,
efficacy, and skill. These dimensions are the foundation of person perception because they help
individuals first assess if someone is a friend or a foe, that is, if a person intends to be kind and
considerate, or if, they are self (vs. other) interested. Next, the competence dimension helps
individuals evaluate how capable a person is in carrying out goals that will either benefit others,
or benefit themselves. These two dimensions repeatedly arise in studies on person and group
perception. The Ohio State leadership studies (Stogdill, 1948, 1974) distinguish between
“consideration” (warmth in terms of approachability and concern) and “initiating structure”
(competence-orientation, in terms of role/task clarity and performance standards). These
concepts continue to serve as the basis for leadership research, where styles are thought of as
various combinations of warmth and competence. For example, authoritarian or autocratic
leadership emphasizes competence while sacrificing warmth, whereas democratic or
participative styles emphasize a leader’s warmth at the expense of skills and expertise (Chemers,
1997). Further, similar to the development of status-related research, studies on situational
leadership have argued that authoritarian, or participative leadership styles are more or less
appropriate given other factors, such as the type of task or stage of the relationship (Vecchio,
1987; Hersey & Blanchard, 1969).
In both the status research tradition and the area of person perception, these dimensions are
used as fundamental evaluation criteria for reasons that ultimately guide interaction patterns
within the workplace. Additionally, the importance and attention paid to each these dimensions
may vary based on situational, task-based, and, as is argued in this paper, individual factors.
Thus, while research on workplace status and person perception are very similar, they have also
taken on unique theoretical interests and motivations. While both traditions argue that status and
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warmth are important, status researchers tend to emphasize competence judgments. On the other
hand, Fiske and colleagues (2016) argue that information about warmth is more cognitively
accessible, more predictive, and more heavily weighted than competence. Missing from both
approaches is a consideration of how individual ideologies may motivate individuals to be more
or less attentive to competence vs. warmth, or vice versa.
Indeed, some scholars suggest that an emphasis on the status-competence link reflects taken
for granted assumptions of universal values. More recently, this perspective has been supported
by empirical findings that focus on how cultural orientation predicts the way that people attain
status and ascribe status to others (Torelli et al., 2014). Whereas those with an individualistic
cultural orientation tend to emphasize personal goals of achievement, success, and self-reliance,
collectivistic cultures emphasize sociability and interdependence (Triandis, 1995). These
differences are non-trivial, as evinced by findings that collectivists tend to engage in statusstriving by demonstrating helpful behaviors, and individualists attempt to achieve status by
demonstrating their skills and expertise (Torelli et al., 2014). Moreover, these distinctions guide
how people judge and evaluate others, with individualists ascribing higher status to actors who
display autonomy and expertise, and collectivists conferring higher status to actors who exhibit
pro-social behaviors (Torelli et al., 2014). This paper will extend these findings to suggest that
status evaluations are grounded not only by a broader cultural lens, but also by more personal
views about the nature of social hierarchies and inequalities.
There is reason to believe that the way that people make sense of status hierarchies within the
broader context of society influences how they perceive and assign status to actors within the
workplace. A well-established body of research shows that differences in social dominance
orientation (SDO) predict a range of important outcomes, including individual values, job
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preferences, and biases in allocating resources (Pratto et al., 1994; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, &
Malle, 1994). A range of organizational policies and practices has been spurred by egalitarian
beliefs, including policies such as Affirmative Action, minimum wage, and unionization
practices. Indeed, studies have found that those high on SDO are reliably opposed to Affirmative
Action policies (Aquino, Stewart, & Reed, 2005; Federico & Sidanius, 2002).
At a more granular level, individual ideologies have been shown to influence discriminatory
beliefs, with those high on SDO showing higher levels of bias against underrepresented groups
but also displaying a respect for authority (Unzueta et al., 2014; Umphress, et al., 2008; Aquino,
Stewart & Reed, 2005). This makes sense, given elitists’ support of existing hierarchal orderings.
Similarly, foundational work on social dominance orientation demonstrated that people seek
work roles that are compatible with their SDO levels. Early researchers grouped work roles into
“hierarchy-enhancing,” or those that are primarily aimed at protecting, serving, or benefiting
elite members of society (e.g., politics, police, law) and “hierarchy attenuating”, or work roles
that are more beneficial for the common good (e.g., teachers, healthcare services). They
discovered a positive relationship between self-reported SDO and whether students intended to
enter hierarchy-attenuating or hierarchy-enhancing career paths (Pratto et al., 1994). Moreover,
work in this area also emphasizes the role of institutions in reinforcing ideologies. That is, the
match between individuals’ attitudes and institutional goals is one of mutual contribution and
reward. One study of a police department found that police officers with the most civilian
complaints for brutality and excessive force also received some of the most positive performance
evaluations from their supervisors (Christopher et al., 1991). These findings demonstrate the
taken for granted links between ideology, behavior, and rewards between people and institutions.
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While SDO is a well-validated measure of ideology, since the early years of its development,
there have been few follow up studies focused on examining the foundational mechanisms that
undergird its predictive power for higher-order societal attitudes. That is, there is a lack of
research that explicitly examines how the support or rejection of attitudes related to SDO affects
social judgments and evaluations. I posit that a lack of knowledge in this area presents a prime
opportunity for us to advance our understanding of the elusive space between individual
ideologies and shared (or divergent) status understandings.
Part I: How does ideology influence status-seeking behaviors?
People are thought to think, feel, and behave in ideologically meaningful ways (Jost,
2006). That is, whether or not individuals are aware of where they stand within a hierarchal
order, they adapt beliefs that either implicitly support and approve of existing hierarchal
arrangements, or, conversely, they adapt beliefs that challenge the merit or legitimacy of
hierarchal orderings. As a guiding principle, then, ideologies influence individuals by motivating
their behaviors. The workplace is a particularly salient place for individuals to embody their
belief systems, due to the variety of roles that are involved in the continuous reproduction of
local status hierarchies.
Since elitists, or those who are motivated by hierarchy-enhancing beliefs, tend to endorse
social inequalities, it is predicted that they are more likely to subscribe to the belief that
individuals should be independent and self-reliant. That is, elitists mostly believe that people
already possess the resources that they are entitled to. As such, this belief system is more
accurately embodied through independent behaviors, rather than interdependent behaviors that
focus on expanding opportunities and potential progress for others. On the other hand,
egalitarians, or those who are motivated by hierarchy-attenuating beliefs, tend to see social
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inequalities as a problem. Thus, egalitarians are predicted to be more likely to take on warm,
supportive roles that are focused on helping others and being considerate towards their needs.
Since egalitarians believe that the hierarchy-attenuating is a noble cause, I predict that they are
likely to demonstrate related behaviors when trying to win the respect and admiration of others.
H1a: SDO is positively related to the attitude that people should pursue status via
competence-related behaviors.
H1b: SDO is negatively related to the attitude that people should pursue status via
warmth-related behaviors.
Method
Prior to the actual study, the SDO scale and the items for status striving were presented to
subject matter experts (10 faculty and graduate students) who helped revise the SDO (Sidanius,
Pratto, & Malworth 2014) and competence/warmth behavior scales (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu,
2002) used in prior research. The SDO scale was revised based on input from faculty (see
Appendix A) to bring the targets down from the societal level to the individual level, as seems
most appropriate for a study on individuals in organizations. Additionally, certain items were
removed because they were broad or de-contextualized. For the competence/warmth behavior
scale, faculty and students provided suggestions to revise these items in a way that reflected
practical behaviors that might be typical to a workplace, in general (see Appendix B). In
addition, preliminary data was collected via 10 survey responses, including qualitative and
quantitative data, in order to ensure consistency between suggested status-related behaviors and
the scale items. Next, an a priori power analysis was conducted to estimate a target sample size
using G*Power analysis. After specifying a model with t-tests using linear multiple regression to
observe a single regression coefficient, the analysis suggested a target size of 56 participants to
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capture a small effect size of .20, with a desired statistical power level of .95 and probability of
.05.
In total,133 participants were recruited (47% male, 66% Caucasian, mean working
experience = 14 years), from a variety of backgrounds and industries, with an inclusion criteria
of at least 2 years of work experience. Participants were recruited via Qualtrics, which is an
aggregator of panels. Qualtrics works with a number of panel providers. Each panel has its own
method of recruitment, though all are fairly similar. Typically, respondents can choose to join a
panel through a double opt-in process. Upon registration, they enter some basic data about
themselves, including demographic information, hobbies, interests, etc. When a survey is created
that the individual would qualify for based on the information they have given, they are notified
via e-mail and invited to participate in the survey for a given incentive. Incentives are given on a
point system. These points can be pooled and later redeemed in the form of gift cards, Skymiles,
credit for online games, etc. For this study, when converting points to monetary value, on
average, participants were compensated $1 for their completion of the survey.
Participants were asked to identify behaviors that should be demonstrated to gain status (i.e.,
“What should someone do to gain respect and admiration from supervisor/colleagues?”) They
were then asked to rate the importance of twelve behaviors using a 7 point scale (1=almost
never, 7 = very frequently). Additionally, participants were given the opportunity to list
behaviors that were not represented by the given categories. Participants were also asked to rate
each item in terms of the extent to which they signal competence (“To what extent does this
behavior suggest that one is competent, capable, and intelligent?”) and warmth (“To what extent
does this behavior suggest that one is interpersonally warm, good natured, and sincere?”). After
completing this survey, subjects completed a revised version of the Social Dominance
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Orientation (SDO) (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth and Malle, 1994) scale, which asks them to rate
the extent to which they are high on hierarchy attenuating or hierarchy enhancing beliefs, (e.g.,
“In an ideal world, all people would be equal,” “It is sometimes necessary to step on others to get
ahead in life.”
Results
To assess the construct validity of the Competence/Warmth and SDO multi-item scales, a
confirmatory factor analysis was performed using Mplus. For the Competence/Warmth scale, the
data was fit to a two-factor model (competence and warmth) which revealed reasonable fit (CFI
= .66, RMSEA = .20), and was somewhat better than the fit of a single-factor model (CFI = .61,
RMSEA = .21, Δχ2= 88, p < .01). For SDO, after observing select poor loadings for a single
factor model, further analysis revealed that a two factor CFA model (egalitarianism and
dominance sub-scales) fit the data reasonably well (CFI = .95, RMSEA = .09) and showed
improvement over a single factor model (CFI = .69, RMSEA = .24, Δχ2= 256.5, p < .01). The
results of this analysis demonstrated that there were two sub-scales embedded in the SDO scale.
Indeed, more recent research on social dominance orientation suggests that SDO-D is a sub-scale
that captures preferences that support systems of inequality and dominance via forceful, overt
oppression, while SDO-E is a distinct scale that reflects a preference for inequality via more
subtle hierarchy-enhancing ideologies (Ho et al., 2015). Follow up analyses were conducted
using each of these sub-scales as distinct predictors, however, no significant results were found.
To analyze the results of the main predictive model, a simple linear regression was calculated
to predict the relationship between social dominance orientation and patterns of categorizing
effective status seeking behaviors. Warmth and competence-signaling behaviors were specified
as independent variables and social dominance orientation as a dependent variable. A significant
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regression equation was found, demonstrating that SDO was positively related to the attitude that
competence-signaling behaviors (b = .12, p = .02, R2 = .04, 95% CI .016 to .22) are appropriate
ways of gaining status, while SDO was negatively related to the statement that warmth-signaling
behaviors (b = -.18, p = .00, R2 = .08, 95% CI -.28 to -.08) should be used to gain status.
Discussion
The results of this study suggest that social dominance orientation is a meaningful
ideological difference that predicts how people think others should seek status within the
workplace. That is, those that are high in SDO are much more likely than those who are low in
SDO to state that people should demonstrate competence related signals and behaviors. On the
other hand, those that are low on SDO are more likely to state that people should demonstrate
warmth related behaviors to gain the respect and esteem of others. These findings suggest that
the implications of ideological difference extend to beliefs regarding differences in appropriate
behaviors. This has important implications for status in the workplace, since managers and
employees alike may employ strategies that may or may not be recognized by others. For
example, an employee who is high on SDO might believe he should demonstrate self-reliance by
working on a project independently, whereas another employee who is low on SDO may believe
he should engage in more helping behaviors. A manager who observes these differences might
believe that one employee is more motivated to obtain esteem and recognition in the workplace,
when each person may be equally motivated to gain respect and status. It follows that ideological
differences likely have an important influence on beliefs regarding effective status-related
behaviors within the workplace.
Part II: How does ideology influence status conferral?
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Just as ideologies become guiding principles for behaviors, so should ideology influence
social judgment. That is, if we expect ideologies to influence the means through which people
attempt to gain status, individuals should also possess the belief that the same set of behaviors
should be rewarded. It follows that while organizational behavior literature on personnel
selection and hiring and sociological literature on the effects of ideology have developed as
separate streams of investigation, the process of hiring job candidates is an inherently subjective
process of evaluation. While some recent research has brought light to the process of
organizational matching with candidates as an interpersonal exchange of cultural matching
(Rivera, 2012), less work has developed this perspective to identify the role of ideology on status
granting as an organizational practice.
One of the most critical ways that status evaluations have implications for organizations
is through processes of personnel selection, or hiring. Whereas hiring research acknowledges that
similarity often drives perceptions of the desirability of candidates, this work has limited its
focus to attention of similarities in sex or race (Elliot & Smith 2004; Gorman, 2005). Further,
such demographics are often treated as proxies for deeper level similarities such as shared
culture. However, we know that demographic factors are only a part of individuals’ identities,
and similarity predictions are often moderated by other variables (Ely, 1995), which suggests
that demographic differences alone do not always substitute for differences in values or
subjective ideals. In a neighboring field of research, studies on person-organizational fit often
assume that organizations and people represent objective entities of characteristics that
complement or supplement one another. However, missing from this perspective is a
consideration of how organizations are often represented by individuals (e.g., recruiters, hiring
managers) who possess their own set of subjective values, beliefs, and interests. While there is
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comparatively little research that directly focuses on similarity between hiring managers and
potential candidates (for an exception, see Cable, 1996), there is evidence that subjective
preferences may result in the formulation of unique and specific criteria. For example, recruiters
have been shown to put job candidates at the top of the list when they discover shared interests,
such as being a fan of the same sport (Rivera, 2012). If superficial commonalities override
otherwise “objective” criteria, it makes sense that individuals’ deep rooted ideologies in regard to
the favorability of hierarchy and inequality might influence perceived value similarity, and
subsequent status evaluations.
As mentioned, status is accorded to those who are considered to provide or have the
potential to offer valuable resources and contributions that assist in the accomplishment of
particular goals. Thus, elitists, or those high on SDO, are expected to confer status on those who
are seen as competent and self-reliant, while valuing the warmth dimension as less valuable to a
legitimate, functioning hierarchy. That is, since those who score highly on SDO believe that
inequality is a hard fact of life, it is predicted that they will have higher respect for those with an
independent mindset. Such individuals may appear as if they have ‘rightly’ accepted this
ordering and are willing and ready to compete. On the other hand, egalitarians, or those who
score low on SDO, are expected to reward individuals who demonstrate warm behaviors with
comparatively higher status, since such behaviors are more associated with egalitarian values and
beliefs. It follows that those high on SDO will consider behaviors that are related to warmth as
actions worthy of admiration and high regard.
H2a: The relationship between SDO and status evaluations is moderated by competence,
such that the relationship between SDO and status evaluations is positive when
competence is high and negative when competence is low.

60

H2b: The relationship between SDO and status evaluations is moderated by warmth,
such that the relationship between SDO and status evaluations is positive when warmth is
low and negative when warmth is high.
Method
To test these hypotheses, the same sample of individuals as used in Part I were told they
would be presented with excerpts from cover letters from hypothetical job candidates. The cover
letter varied along dimensions of warmth and competence. The cover letter excerpts were
presented to SMEs (a small group of 10 graduate students and faculty) who participated in a
matching exercise and were asked to guess which category was represented by each of the
excerpts. The SMEs confirmed that the cover letter excerpts accurately represented one of
desired four categories – high warmth and low competence, high competence and low warmth,
high warmth and competence, and finally, low on warmth and competence. For the high
competence candidate, their personal statement included items such as “I pride myself in
delivering superior work with minimal guidance or direction,” “My high level of expertise
allows me to work independently,” “I always deliver results, by any means necessary”, and
“Performance is the key to business.”, in combination with low warmth statements. The
candidate who is high on warmth had personal statement phrases such as, “Relationships are the
key to business”, “As a leader, I think it is important to develop the skills and talents of others”,
“I am passionate about providing opportunities for others”, and “I excel at building quality
relationships,” In combination with low competence statements. Finally, participants were
presented with candidate information for subjects high in both warmth and competence and low
in both warmth and competence. In the case of candidates who were low in both warmth and
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competence, statements were included such as, “One day, I would like to gain the skills required
to work independently, and “I hope to gain the skills to work well with others.”
After reading a candidate’s cover letter excerpt, participants were asked to evaluate his or her
status according to five items (high-status, respected, admired by others, high prestige, regarded
highly by others) along a seven-point scale (1= strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). After
completing this survey, subjects completed a revised version of the Social Dominance
Orientation (SDO) (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth and Malle, 1994) scale, which asks them to rate
the extent to which they are high on hierarchy attenuating or hierarchy enhancing beliefs, (e.g.,
“In an ideal world, all people would be equal,” “It is sometimes necessary to step on others to get
ahead in life.”
Results
A manipulation check was included to check whether participants perceived a significant
difference between candidates in terms of competence and warmth based on the experimental
conditions to which they were assigned. The manipulation check included 4 items to check how
warm candidates were perceived (e.g., “This is a good natured person,” “This is an
interpersonally warm person”) in addition to 4 items to check how competent candidates were
perceived as being (e.g., “This is a competent person,” “This is a capable person”). The
manipulation check was analyzed by conducting a t-test to compare means across groups. After
each condition was dummy coded (0,1), the results of the manipulation check indicated that there
was a statistically significant difference between high and low warmth conditions. There was a
homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of variances (p = .674). The
mean warmth rating for those assigned to low warmth conditions (m = 4.18, sd =1.55) was -.58
lower than (95% CI, -1.00 to -.15) those assigned to high warmth conditions (m = 4.76, sd =
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1.35). There was a statistically significant difference in mean ratings between conditions t(129) =
-2.68, p = .008. However, there was not a statistically significant difference detected between
high and low competence conditions. The homogeneity of variances test as assessed by
Levene’s test for equality of variances was violated (p = .015). The mean competence rating for
those assigned to a low competence condition (m = 5.25, sd = 1.25) was -.26 (95% CI, -.59 to
.085) lower than those assigned to a high competence (m = 5.51, sd = .92) condition, although
this difference was not statistically significant t(129) = -1.48, p = .144.
To analyze this model, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted. The
data was organized so that the results of status evaluations from all candidates was aggregated
into one status rating variable. Then, each condition was dummy coded according whether
candidates were meant to represent high (1) or low (0) warmth and competence. First,
competence was examined as a moderator of the relationship between social dominance
orientation and status evaluations. Two variables were entered in the first step of regression
analysis: social dominance orientation (b = -.01, p = .96, ns), and competence (b = -.12, p = .64,
ns). The overall model did not account for a significant amount of variance F 2,130 = .11, p = .89,
ns. In the second step of the model, the interaction term was added (b = .15, p = .47, ns), and the
overall model did not improve in terms of variance explained ΔR2 = .00, F3,129 = .25, p = .47, ns.
This model yielded nonsignificant results, demonstrating that neither competence nor SDO alone
or entered as an interaction term share a meaningful relationship with status evaluations.
Since the manipulation check was unsuccessful in prompting participants to detect
differences between high and low competence candidates, I conducted additional analyses to
assess the effects when omitting those who “failed” the manipulation check, or did not associate
high and low competence candidates with their desired conditions. The results remained
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nonsignificant. That is, when re-running the above analyses, the overall model did not account
for a significant amount of variance F 2,108 = .14, p = .87, ns. It follows that the specific
predictors, including SDO (b = .04, p = .67, ns), competence (b = .31, p = .21, ns), and the
interaction term (b = .32, p = .22, ns), were also un-meaningful predictors of status ratings.
Next, warmth was examined as a moderator of the relationship between social dominance
orientation and status evaluations. A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted and
social dominance orientation and warmth were entered in the first step. The overall model
accounted for a significant amount of variance F 2,129 = 3.99, = .021. However, while warmth (b
= .68, p = .01, 95% CI .20 to 1.16) was a significant predictor, SDO was not (b = -.01, p = .93,
ns). In the second step, the interaction term was added, however the model did not improve

ΔR2 = .00, F3,128 = .20, p = .66, ns. Further, SDO (b = -.05, p = .70, ns), warmth (b= .42, p = .50,
ns) and the product term (b = .09, p = .66, ns) were not significant.1 These results rule out the
potential for a moderation effect.
Part III: How does ideology influence performance evaluations?
As mentioned, the functional theory of status asserts that status assignments serve the
purpose of identifying individuals who are most capable of performance. In other words,
individuals attend to cues such as competence and warmth to ascertain the level of potential
value offered to a given group. These assessments feed a self-fulfilling prophecy, wherein high
status individuals are given a greater range of opportunities and resources to perform well.
Beyond this initial boost, there is evidence that high status individuals, in comparison to low
status individuals, are also rewarded with more favorable performance reviews for identical

1 The ANOVA for this regression equation including the interaction term reported significance
(p = .05). This is likely due to multicollinearity (VIF range 6-8).
64

behaviors (e.g., Berger, Rosenholtz, & Selditch, 1980; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). It follows that
the way in which people assign status has a rolling, positive effect on how the performance of
high status individuals is evaluated in the future. Thus, I expect that elitists will give higher
performance evaluations to those who demonstrate competence behaviors, and egalitarians will
give higher performance evaluations to those who demonstrate higher warmth behaviors.
Further, it is posited that those high in SDO will be more impressed by competence behaviors
when they are also paired with low warmth, and that those are low on SDO will be more
impressed by warmth behaviors in the absence of competence-signaling behaviors.
H3a: The relationship between SDO and performance evaluations is moderated by
candidate competence, such that the relationship between SDO and performance
evaluations is positive when competence is high and negative when competence is low.
H3b: The relationship between SDO and performance evaluations is moderated by
candidate warmth, such that the relationship between SDO and performance evaluations
is positive when candidate warmth is low and negative when candidate warmth is high.
Method
Participants were randomly presented with appraisals for four employees at a given firm,
using performance appraisals adopted from work used in prior research (Leslie, Manchester,
Park & Mehng, 2012). Performance ratings were given for each of six dimensions, on a scale of
1 (poor) to 5 (excellent). While three of these dimensions were related to competence (e.g.,
“secures relevant information and identifies possible causes of problems”), three signaled
employee warmth behaviors (e.g. “demonstrates the ability and willingness to express opposing
viewpoints with tact and consideration”). A small group of subject matter experts (10 faculty and
graduate students) confirmed that the items were accurate reflections of these dimensions. The
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high competence employee was shown to have very high competence ratings (M=4.7), and
below the scale midpoint on warmth (M=2.3). The high warmth employee had scales that are just
the opposite, excelling at warmth (M=4.7), but with low competence ratings. A third employee
had both high competence and high warmth ratings (M=4.7). Finally, a fourth employee had
both low competence and low warmth ratings (M=2.3). After reviewing the information,
participants were asked to evaluate the status of these employees according to five items (highstatus, respected, admired by others, high prestige, regarded highly by others) along a sevenpoint scale (1= strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree).
Finally, a manipulation check was used where participants were asked to rate the employees
according to four measures of competence (competent, capable, intelligent, and ambitious) and
warmth (interpersonally warm, good-natured, sincere, trustworthy). After completing this survey,
subjects completed a revised version of the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) (Pratto,
Sidanius, Stallworth and Malle, 1994) scale, which asks them to rate the extent to which they are
high on hierarchy attenuating or hierarchy enhancing beliefs, (e.g., “In an ideal world, all people
would be equal,” “It is sometimes necessary to step on others to get ahead in life.”
Results
The same manipulation check included in Part II was also used in Part III to assess
whether employees were perceived differently based on warmth and competence conditions. The
manipulation check was analyzed by conducting a t-test to compare means across groups. After
each condition (warmth/competence) was dummy coded (0,1), the results of the manipulation
check indicated that there was a statistically significant difference between high and low warmth
conditions as well as a high and low competence conditions, demonstrating that the manipulation
used in this experiment was effective. In the case of comparing across warmth conditions, the
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assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, as assessed by Levene’s test for equality
of variances (p = .00). The mean warmth rating for those assigned to low warmth conditions (m
= 4.58, sd = 1.69) was -.6 lower (95% CI, -1.08 to -.13) than those assigned to high warmth
conditions (m = 5.18, sd = .89). There was a statistically significant difference in mean ratings
between conditions t(129) = -2.49, p = .003. Similarly, in the case of competence conditions, the
assumption of homogeneity of variances test as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of
variances was violated (p = .00). The mean competence rating for those assigned to a low
competence condition (m = 4.43, sd = 1.69) was -.26 (95% CI, -.59 to .085) lower than those
assigned to a high competence condition (m = 5.69, sd = .77) a statistically significant difference
t(129) = -6.57, p = .00. This demonstrates that the manipulation check was effective.
The data was first organized by aggregating performance evaluations across all categories
into one outcome variable. Next, all participants were given a dummy code variable based on
whether they were assigned to high (1) or low (0) conditions in competence and warmth. A
hierarchical multiple regression was performed to test the hypotheses that warmth and
competence moderate the relationship between SDO and performance evaluations, or more
specifically, that SDO has a positive relationship with performance evaluations when
competence is high and a negative relationship with performance evaluations when warmth is
high. First, competence was analyzed as a moderator. In the first step, two variables were
included: competence and SDO. The overall model accounted for a significant amount of
variance F 2,130 = 4.69, p = .01. However, while competence was a significant predictor of
performance evaluations (b = .7, p = .00, 95% CI .24 to 1.17), SDO was not (b = .07, p = .45,
ns). In the second step of the model, the interaction term was added and each of the predictors
were non-significant, including competence (b = .81, p = .19, ns), SDO (b = .09, p = .50, ns) and
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the product term (b = -.04, p = .84, ns). This model did not show a significant improvement in
variance explained ΔR2 = .00, p = .84, ns.
Next, the moderating effect of warmth was tested by entering warmth and SDO into the first
step of a multiple regression model. The overall model accounted for a significant amount of
variance F 2,130 = 5.95, p = .00. More specifically, warmth was a significant predictor of
performance evaluations (b = .79, p = .00, 95% CI .35 to 1.25), whereas SDO was not (b = .05, p
= .60, ns). In the second step of the model, the interaction term was added and the overall model
did not improve ΔR2 = .00, F3,129 = 4.03, p = .61, ns. In this model, none of the predictors were
significant, including warmth (b = .39, p = .09, ns), SDO (b = .09, p = .47, ns) or the interaction
term (b = -.01, p = .61, ns). This model did not demonstrate a significant improvement in
variance explained, and rules out the potential for a moderation effect ΔR2 = .00, p = .61, ns.2
Part II & III: Limitations & Discussion
There were many potential limitations to this study that might explain why these experiments
yielded null results. Whereas the instruments used in this study were adapted from prior research,
the results of the manipulation check, there were certain cases where the manipulation proved
ineffective. Still, even in cases where the manipulation check was successful, SDO was not
observed to be a significant predictor of status or performance evaluations. It may be that SDO,
as a predictor, is not as related to objective evaluations as it is to socially relative evaluations.
For example, while SDO has been used as a measure to capture general beliefs about inequality,
it originated as a measure that reflected attitudes towards specific ingroups and outgroups. In this
way, it is possible that SDO is relevant to ratings and evaluations only insofar as individuals can

2 The ANOVA for this regression equation including the interaction term reported significance
(p = .01). This is likely due to multicollinearity (VIF range 7-8).
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detect social information that can aid them in identifying whether the target is at the “bottom” or
“top” of the pyramid within the greater context of societal inequality. It would be instructive for
future studies to include more information about social characteristics in addition to competence
and warmth signals, for example, socioeconomic status, race, and/or gender. It would be
interesting if ideological differences only come to light once people are able to detect where
social actors stand within a greater system of social inequality. Moreover, future research should
take further steps to examine how this evaluation process is similar or different from selfevaluations and social comparisons.
Another point of consideration is that the construct of interest here refers to a globalized
operationalization of status, whereas future studies might benefit from a more specific
investigation of individualized social evaluations. That is, in this study, participants were asked
to rate candidates in terms of perceived respect and esteem held by others towards that person.
However, if we were to ask participants how much respect they personally have for a given
candidate, we might observe a different response. The improved understanding of the awareness
and mechanisms that lead to personalized beliefs diverging from global beliefs could serve as a
fruitful area for future research.
Despite certain null findings, this did yield a significant outcome - ideology does
influence the extent to which people make statements about how people should demonstrate
competence-signaling behaviors vs. warmth signaling behaviors to gain status. This is an
important discovery because it demonstrates that people believe that they should act differently
even when seeking the same social reward: status and respect. While researchers have used the
social dominance orientation framework to understand social attitudes and beliefs, this work
unpacks the more granular effects of ideology. If ideological values influence the way that
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people weigh the importance of behaviors related to warmth and competence, these findings
have implications for why people in the workplace may have diverging views regarding who
should be hired to work for a company, who should be promoted into a leadership role, and
which employees are demonstrating valuable performance.
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Table 1
Essay 1: Means, Standard Deviations and Intercorrelations among Focal Variables
Variables
Mean SD
r
1
2
3
4
5
Part I
1. Social Dominance Orientation
2. Warmth Behaviors
3. Competence Behaviors

2.98
3.69
3.44

1.23
0.80
0.77

.80
.84
.67

--0.29**
0.20

Part II
1. High competence rating
2. High warmth rating
3. High comp/warmth rating
4. Low comp/warmth rating

4.46
5.27
5.27
4.80

1.49
1.14
1.15
1.71

.96
.86
.94
.97

-0.01
-0.13
0.21
-0.04

Part III
1. High competence performance
2. High warmth performance
3. High comp/warm performance
4. Low comp/warm performance

5.10
5.00
5.52
4.02

1.16
0.82
1.23
1.75

.88
.91
.95
.98

0.03
-0.09
0.09
0.12

Notes. N = 133.
* p < .05
** p < .01
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-0.39

ESSAY THREE: COMPETITION OR COLLABORATION?
THE SITUATIONAL IMPORTANCE OF STATUS BASED INTERACTIONS
Does the personal belief that one possesses a high-ranking status position obstruct or
promote collaboration with others? More specifically, is it possible for multiple people with selfperceived high status to work together effectively, or is there only enough room for one person at
the top? This question has both practical and theoretical importance, since there are many
settings where multiple actors who have achieved high status in disparate arenas are expected to
come together to solve complex problems. I posit that status distinctions and the interaction
patterns that follow are situationally activated. Situational factors guide actor’s motives and
behaviors in two important ways: 1) by heightening or reducing feelings of interpersonal threat,
and 1) by encouraging actors to focus on personal or shared goals. For the purpose of this
research, I focus on situations with collaborative or competitive potential, and highlight the ways
that status beliefs may help or hinder the achievement of personal and shared performance gains.
Status is defined as the level of respect, esteem, and prominence held by a person in the
eyes of others. While others confer status, people are engaged in a constant process of
interpreting and acting out their self-perceived status position. Whether status is assigned
through formal organizational titles, or informal prestige, those who possess high status enjoy a
number of privileges by virtue of their social standing. More recently, researchers have begun to
focus on the possibilities and consequences of status-motivated interactions, with close attention
paid to cases when more than one person sees themselves at the top of the social hierarchy
(Kilduff, Willer & Anderson, Gardner, 2012; Bendersky & Hays, 2012).
This topic has important implications for management, since bidding wars over high
status actors is common practice across a broad range of organizations, including sports teams,
academic departments, consulting firms, start-up firms, and boards of directors. Indeed, the goal
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of strategic human resource management often involves the recruitment of high-status
individuals with the hopes of assembling a high performance team. However, there are subtleties
to the interpretation of status that may sometimes allow individuals to leverage one another’s
high standing or, at other times, get in each others’ way. Further, according to the conflict
literature, status conflict is the must detrimental form of conflict, yet, we know less about the
conditions or situational factors that cause such conflicts to arise in the first place (Bendersky &
Hays, 2012).
While extant research in this area has provided valuable insights to our understanding of
how perceptions lead to patterned behaviors, it has also been overwhelmingly focused on the
negative shared outcomes of several actors’ self-perceived high status, while discounting the
possibility of positive effects. For example, those involved in perceptual status disagreements
have been shown to reduce their information sharing or withdraw their contributions, which, in
turn, interrupts group processing and hurts performance (Kilduff, Willer & Anderson, 2016;
Bendersky & Hays, 2012). Status may also hinder shared functionality by becoming the topic of
conflict, as demonstrated when competition over status distracts from task achievement (Hildreth
& Angus, 2016). In another case, too many high status actors may eventually result in
performance loss, especially when individuals’ areas of expertise are shown to overlap
(Groysberg, 2011). Moreover, status conflicts are highly detrimental, as evinced by research that
demonstrates a stronger relationship between status conflict and reduced performance than all
other types - including task, process, or relationship based conflict (Bendersky & Hays, 2012).
The goal of this research is to explore how self-perceptions of high status influence
individuals’ ability to work with others. I posit that although perceptual conflict between two
actors who see themselves as high status is typically expected to lead to negative outcomes
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(Bendersky & Hays, 2012; Gardner, 2010; Kilduff, Willer, & Anderson, 2016), there is also the
potential for positive opportunities. That is, collaborative situations that prompt individuals to
focus on shared outcomes may weaken the negative link between high self-rated status and
performance, or in some cases, even reverse the direction of this relationship. When actors are
encouraged to focus on shared goals, the ambiguity that allows for perceptions of competition
and feelings of threat should be dispelled. This should lead actors to focus on their status position
as an opportunity to support others rather than a means to bolster their own self-interest. Further,
since the experience of high status is associated with a proactive orientation (Bunderson et al.,
2011), dyads that both feel they have high status are in a unique position to discover and leverage
one another’s strengths. Ultimately, it is expected that high status actors will demonstrate an
increased ability to work with others in order to enhance communication and clarify task-related
goals for more effective collaboration.
I posit that prior research has relied on two central assumptions, both of which are open
to challenge. First, while previous studies assume that beliefs about high status lead to selfserving outcomes, I argue that the way in which people act out their status is guided by whether
they are motivated by a personal or social frame. This notion is supported by recent theory that
makes a distinction between bases of hierarchy, highlighting the difference between independent
and interdependent positions of power and status (Blader, Shirako & Chen, 2016). Second, prior
studies have focused on the relative nature of hierarchal status, emphasizing the “zero-sum”
nature of status orderings, wherein only one person can be on top. This thinking prompts high
status actors to be especially attentive to perceived threats to their position. While the relative
nature of status is a methodological truth, I argue that subjective experiences of high status do
not always subscribe to this schema. Indeed, a substantial body of research posits that “win-lose”
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mental frames constitute a perceptual bias in situations characterized by a surplus of unrealized
gains (Nadler, Thompson & Jount, 2000; De dreu et al., 2000; Liu et al., 2016). I will expand this
line of research to consider cases where self-perceived high status actors might come together in
order to maximize shared value.
Power and status are closely related concepts, with important distinctions. Whereas
power refers to social influence and control (Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Blader, Shirako & Chen,
2016), status reflects one’s level of worth, value, and competencies as conferred by others
(Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). Within the related stream of power research, the question of
whether power increases or decreases pro-social motives and behaviors has produced mixed
results (Galinsky, et al., 2006; Lammers et al., 2008). Researchers have explained this
divergence by delineating between two distinct forms of power: personal and social. Whereas
personal power refers to autonomy and freedom from the others, social power refers to control
and influence over others (e.g., Weber, 1978). If personal power is based on independence, those
who experience this form of power are free from the opinions and actions of others, which
prompts them to attend to their social environment less. Tost (2015) makes a distinction between
structural power and psychological power, arguing that structural power (e.g., role-based) is
more likely to create a sense of responsibility, which causes actors to be more responsive and
attentive to the needs of others.
This line of reasoning is very similar to more recent work on status. Rather than parsing
out a separate form of power, some researchers have suggested that mixed findings in the power
research are due to the conflation of power with status (Blader, Shirako, Chen, 2016). This
perspective argues that since status is by definition conferred by others, those with high status
become more closely attuned to the needs of those around them. Indeed, the differential effects
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of status and power have been empirically tested, suggesting that those with high status tend to
exhibit higher levels of fairness and justice in their interactions with others, whereas high levels
of power have the opposite effect (Blader & Chen, 2012).
Together, recent directions in power and status research demonstrate that these concepts
are much more complex than previously assumed. Further, while studies are beginning to
uncover how self-perceived high status actors interact with low status actors, in benevolent
versus self-serving ways, few studies have focused specifically on the interaction between two
individuals who both see themselves as high status. I argue that a consideration of situational
characteristics will allow us to unravel between critical differences in status-motivated
interactions.
High/High Status Dyads in Competitive Situations: Personal and Shared Value
So how do we explain past findings that “too many cooks in the kitchen,” or people who
see themselves as high status, may be a recipe for disaster (Groysberg et al., 2011; Kilduff et al.,
2016)? I argue that unique features characterize these situations: the perception of threat and a
focus on personal goals. According to the functional view of status, status orderings help
facilitate the group achievement by assigning status to actors who are deemed the most
competent, and directing the flow of communication (Berger, 1972). Deferential behaviors are
traditionally viewed as status signals. These include both verbal and non-verbal microinteractions such as attentive facial expressions, nodding, smiling, praising, or soliciting advice.
From this perspective, deference flows from low status to high status team members (e.g., Berger
et al., 1972) in a process that symbolizes an asymmetrical subordinate-dominant relationship.
The functionality of this social arrangement is supported by dominance complementary theory,
which suggests that high status, dominant actors prefer interaction partners that respond to them
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with conciliatory behavior (Tiedens, Unzueta & Young, 2007).
However, in cases where self-perceived high status actors are working together, it is more
likely that their expectations for how they should be treated will go unmet, or even violated. That
is, two people who both view themselves as high status may find that their interaction partners
withhold acts of deference, failing to treat them in the way they feel they deserve. Thus,
individuals likely experience feelings of threat once they realize that their self-perceived high
status is unrecognized by others. Moreover, this experience is exacerbated by the fact that once
they see themselves as high status, actors become highly attuned to status cues (Blader & Chen,
2011) and develop a heightened sensitivity to threat. Indeed, studies have found that high status
actors tend to be highly reactive and defensive to social evaluations (Gruenewald et al., 2006).
Such findings reflect the inclination for high status actors to become overly concerned with
maintaining their social standing. This focus leads to physiological symptoms, such as increased
stress as measured by elevated cortisol levels (Helhammer, Buchtal, Gutberlet and Kirschbaum,
1997), and ultimately, reduced performance (Marr & Thau, 2014).
While we cannot be certain about the exact mechanisms that lead high status actors to
engage in counterproductive behaviors, I suggest that situational characteristics play a large role
in determining how individuals will interact with one another. For example, in one past study,
high status actors were studied within the highly competitive field of Wall Street equity
(Groysberg et al., 2011). In another study, while the setting was not clearly competitive, selfperceived high status participants had the choice to opt-out from group-related activities, as
suggesting by their withdrawal of contributions (Kilduff et al., 2016). Further, the method of
self-ranking builds on fixed pie perceptions, as when self-perceived high status actors are asked
to rate themselves relative to others. I argue that situational factors may encourage both
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competition and fixed pie perceptions. For actors who perceive themselves as high status, such
an environment may be perceived as threatening, and will lead to suboptimal processes. As
discussed, retaliation may take a subtle form of withdrawal, or it may take a more overt form of
active conflict over status positions. It is expected that in a situation that cannot be immediately
escaped, we will observe higher levels of overt conflict between two high status actors. In both
cases, self-perceived high status actors will demonstrate high levels of self-focus due to concern
about maintaining their standing. It follows that a focus on personal goals (maintaining one’s
status position) will take precedent over task-based processes and shared performance gains.
This may cause actors to be overly suspicious about their interaction partner’s intentions, and
overlook the potential for mutual benefits. If both partners have this mentality, they will be
ineffective at producing value.
H1a: In a competitive situation, a high/high status dyad will achieve higher personal
gains than a low/low status dyad.
H1b: In a competitive situation, a high/high status dyad will achieve higher joint gains
than a low/low status dyad.
H1c: In a competitive situation, a high/low status dyad will achieve higher personal
gains than a high/high status dyad.
H1d: In a competitive situation, a high/low status dyad will achieve higher joint gains
than a high/high status dyad.
High/High Status Dyads in Collaborative Situations: Personal and Shared Value
While comparatively less explored, there is reason to believe that when individuals both
perceive themselves to have high status, there is potential for positive outcomes. Indeed, a
relatively smaller body of research suggests that those who see themselves as high status might
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adopt a pro-social orientation, given certain individual traits or situational characteristics. For
example, individuals who are high on self-monitoring successfully gain status by demonstrating
helpful behaviors (Flynn, et al., 2006). Other researchers have found that when helping behaviors
are rewarded with deference from others, actors are more likely to increase their group
contributions (Willer, 2009).
Further, more recent work challenges the assumption that acts of deference are always
reflections of the status ordering. Contrary to the dominance complementarity view, which
suggests that asymmetric relations are the preferred mode of exchange (Tiedens, 2005), this
work demonstrates that acts of deference are not only limited to beliefs and implications
regarding someone’s superior standing, but also may be motivated by less strategic social
affinities such as warmth, liking, or friendship (Joshi & Knight, 2015). For instance, two team
members working closely together on a strategic proposal for the company might defer to each
other because they share the same interests or objectives with respect to the firm’s strategic
direction, feel a mutual affinity due to similar rank, or because they simply prefer to not
challenge each other’s status on the team (Joshi & Knight, 2015; Fragale et al., 2012; Kalkhoff &
Barnum, 2000). In this way, acts of deference are not always enactments of relative status, they
may also be used as signs of warmth intended to communicate that someone intends to work with
another person rather than against them.
Based on this discussion, I suggest that acts of deference are not always limited to those
who perceive themselves to be low status. In fact, actors who believe themselves to hold high
status might defer to others in order to encourage them to share useful information, motivate
them to be persistent with a difficult task, or acknowledge their performance. This should take
the form of positive reinforcement, which adds to a productive dynamic and buffers the potential
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for feelings of threat. Moreover, these strategies tend to be highly effective. That is, high status
individuals are especially influential when they choose to adopt an interest in collective gains
(Bunderson, 2011). Whereas members of equal-status groups are less inclined to share uniquely
held information (Stasser, 1999), in groups of unequal status, higher status members who
demonstrate a participative style of leadership encourage information sharing ask lower status
others for their unique input and give credit to their contributions (Larson, Foster-Fishman, &
Franz, 1998). Further, the same study found that when high status members do not display a
participative leadership style, the unique information held by lower status members was likely to
be overlooked or ignored.
I argue that in collaborative situations, when self-perceived high status individuals are
primed to focus on creating shared value, we will observe elevated performance. That is, two
high status actors working together should be more effective than any other combination of
status orderings in collaborative situations. This is because high status actors should be more
engaged and motivated than low status actors to accomplish shared goals.
H2a: In a collaborative situation, a high/high status dyad will achieve higher joint gains
than in a competitive situation.
H2b: In a collaborative situation, a high/high status dyad will achieve higher personal
gains than a low/low status dyad.
H2c: In a collaborative situation, a high/high status dyad will achieve higher joint gains
than a low/low status dyad.
Hd2: In a collaborative situation, a high/high status dyad will achieve higher personal
gains than a high/low status dyad.
H2e: In a collaborative situation, a high/high status dyad will achieve higher joint gains
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than a high/low status dyad.
Low/Low Status Dyads in Competitive Situations: Personal and Shared Value
In contrast to those with high status, low status actors have relatively lower levels of selfesteem, which influences their likely behaviors. Actors who perceive themselves as low status
are expected to demonstrate more propitiating behaviors which prevent them from speaking up
or out of turn, challenging others’ opinions, or sharing novel ideas (Bunderson, 2011). Empirical
evidence tends to support these predictions, showing that low-status parties have low levels of
psychological engagement, since their relatively low-status position is likely to undermine their
sense of self and their belief that they have the efficacy to elevate their status (Joshi & Fast,
2013; Marr & Thau, 2014; Phillips & Zuckerman, 2001). Indeed, low status carries negative
implications that may prompt rationalization of one’s low status position (e.g., Jost, Banaji, &
Nosek, 2004) or create psychological disengagement from the group (Smith, Murphy, & Coats,
1999; Tyler & Blader, 2000). Further, in a group of studies examining the causal effects of status
(Anderson, Kraus et al., 2012), the authors found that when participants were asked to imagine
interactions with a partner who had either a low or high level of respect, admiration, and
influence in their social groups, those who were made to experience high status reported higher
levels of subjective well being than those who were manipulated to feel low status.
In a competitive situation, it is expected that low status dyads will do very little in the
way of yielding to one another’s interests and needs. Unlike high status dyads who should be
more actively engaged in promoting their needs, low status dyads are expected to demonstrate
more protective behaviors. That is, low status dyads will demonstrate more defensive behaviors,
but, as compared high status dyads, they will avoid overt conflict. On the other hand, in the case
of dyads that include at least one high status actor, those with high status should be able to
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encourage their partner to share information and become engaged in the process of productive
exchange.
H3a: In a competitive situation, a low/low status dyad will achieve lower personal gains
than a low/high status dyad.
H3b: In a competitive situation, a low/low status dyad will achieve lower joint gains than
a low/high status dyad.
Low/Low Status Dyads in Collaborative Situations: Personal and Shared Value
In a collaborative situation, two low status actors may either display low levels of
engagement, or, they may demonstrate inhibited behaviors. If both actors display low levels of
confidence and assertion, it is expected that they will not reach optimal gains. For these reasons,
it is expected that two low status actors will be comparatively less engaged with a task focused
on creating value than those with high status. Further, in support of the functional theory of
status, the absence of a high status actor will leave low status dyads with a lower comparative
level of responsibility and initiative for high performance.
H4a: In a collaborative situation, a low/low status dyad will achieve lower personal
gains than a low/high status dyad.
H4b: In a collaborative situation, a low/low status dyad will achieve lower joint gains
than a high/low status dyad.
Method
Procedure. Hypotheses presented here were tested with a 3 (status: low/low vs. high/low
vs. high/high) x 2 (situational prime: collaborative vs. competitive) experimental factor design.
This study used a negotiation scenario that has been used in prior research (Dimotakis, Conlon &
Illies, 2012; Conlon, Moon & Ng, 2002; DeRue et al., 2009). Participants in the classroom chose
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partners to create dyads, and each dyad was tasked with settling seven issues. Each participant
was given materials to review regarding the case, as well as information about the roles they will
play, and supporting background information that can be used as points for the development of
positions. After reading the materials, participants were questioned to see if they understood the
issues of the case.
Sample. Participants were recruited from classes at a large university in the Southeast.
An a priori power analysis was conducted to estimate a target sample size using G*Power
analysis. By specifying t-tests to compare the difference between two independent means, the
analysis suggested that 156 participants would be required to capture a medium effect size of .4,
with a desired statistical power level of .8 power and probability of .05. In total, 158 subjects
participated in this study. After removing missing and incomplete data, the hypotheses were
tested on a final sample size of 144 undergraduate business majors. As compensation for their
participation, participants received 2 extra points towards their final course grade.
Negotiation Scenario. This study used a mixed-motive negotiation scenario. While the
scenario and roles across conditions were identical, the pay-off schedule for each of the seven
issues was manipulated so that two of the seven issues (moving expenses and insurance) were
distributive and four of the seven issues had integrative potential. That is, four issues allowed for
potential trade-offs (integrative), whereas two issues were in direct opposition to one another
(distributive). One of the seven issues was compatible, meaning that both negotiation partners
received the same number of points for each potential decision.
Situational manipulation. The situational manipulations were embedded in participants’
role materials. In the competitive condition, participants were told that the two companies have
been engaged in decades of hostile competition. Further, participants were told that their ability
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to perform well and “win” the negotiation by securing more points than their partner, will
determine whether or not they will be titled the new Chief Human Resources Officer of the
merging company. In the collaborative condition, participants were told that it is important to
maintain a friendly relationship with their partner and that their successful collaboration will set
the tone for the future of the company.
Status manipulation. The status manipulations were embedded in participants’ role
materials. Participants were primed to believe that they are high or low status, and were also told
whether their partner is high or low status. The manipulation used here is taken from prior
manipulations of status (Blader & Chen, 2012) within negotiations.
Participants in the high status condition with high status partners were informed:
You and your negotiation partner are quite well known in the industry as high-status
individuals. You are both two of the most respected people in the industry. People really hold
you both in high regard, and you both have a great deal of esteem from others.
Participants in the high status condition with low status partners were informed:
You are quite well known in the industry as a high status individual. You are one of the
most respected people in the industry. People really hold you in high regard, and you have a
great deal of esteem from others. On the other hand, your partner is not well known in the
industry. When making important decisions, they typically defer to others who are held in higher
regard and gave greater industry-level prestige than they possess.
Participants in the low status condition with high status partners were informed:
You are not well known in the industry. When making important decisions, you typically
defer to others who are held in higher regard and have greater industry-level prestige than you
possess. On the other hand, your negotiation partner is quite well known in the industry as a
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high status individual. They are one of the most respected people in the industry. People really
hold them in high regard, and they have a great deal of esteem from others.
Participants in the low status condition with a low status partner were informed:
You and your negotiation partner are not well known in the industry. When making
important decisions, you both typically defer to others who are held in higher regard and have
greater industry-level prestige than you both possess.
Manipulation checks. Participants were asked to answer two questions to verify the
success of the experimental manipulations: “How much status did the character or role you were
playing have?” The question will be answered on a scale ranging from 1 (very little) to 7 (a great
deal). An additional check for the status condition will be in the form of a question, “How
important was it to you that your negotiation partner show respect for you during the
negotiation?” (scale ranging from 1 [not at all] to 7 [very]).
Following the negotiation exercise, personal value was measured according to the
number of individual points participants are able to secure, and shared value will be measured
according to the number of joint gains realized within dyads.
Participants were also asked to complete the Subjective Value Inventory (SVI), which
examines the extent to which partners have built a trusting relationship and would be open to
working together in the future.
Results & Analysis
A manipulation check was included to assess the degree to which the high and low status
prime created a significant difference in the extent to which participants felt as if they were high
status and had higher (or lower) status than their counterpart. A t-test was conducted to compare
means between groups, and demonstrated that the manipulation was effective in creating a
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difference in perceptions of status, but ineffective in creating a difference in how much respect
each participant expected to receive. A t-test showed that those in the high status condition
reported a higher mean than those in the low status condition and there was a statistically
significant difference between groups t(147) = 5.84, p = .05. For the respect item, there was a
homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of variances (p =. 94), while
those in the high status condition reported a higher mean (m = 3.46, sd = .91) than those in the
low status condition (m = 3.41, sd = .93), there was not a statistically significant difference
between groups t(147) = -.33, p = .74. Similarly, the situational prime was ineffective. There was
a homogeneity of variances, as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of variances (p = .90), and
while those in the collaborative condition reported a greater concern (m = 3.65, sd = .59) for
their counterpart than those in the competitive condition (m = 3.53, sd = .57), the difference
between the two was not statistically significant t(139) = 1.3, p = .19.
The analysis for this study occurred in two stages. First, an ANOVA was conducted to
determine if the means between the groups was equal. Next, a series of between-groups analyses
were performed to test each set of proposed hypotheses. The results of the ANOVA suggested
significant main effects of status dyads as well as an interaction between status dyads and the
situation. To identify where these effects were located, I conducted a series of t-tests to compare
group means.
The first set of predictions suggest that within a competitive situation, two high status
partners will achieve higher personal and shared gains than two low status partners. The results
of an independent samples t-tests showed that the mean individual performance of two high
status dyads was higher (10,105) than two low status partners (9,659). That is, high status
partners performed 445 (95% CI, -1,200 to 2,091) points higher than low status partners. There
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was not a statistically significant difference between the two t(40) = .56, p = .57. Next, it was
predicted that high status partners paired with other high status partners will achieve both lower
individual and lower shared gains than when paired with low status partners. An independent
samples t-test was run to determine if there were differences in performance between the two
groups. For individual performance, there was a homogeneity of variances as assessed by
Levene’s test for equality of variances (p = .85). The mean individual performance score for high
status persons paired with high status partners was lower (9,659) than that for high status persons
paired with low status partners (10,259). High status persons’ performance when paired with
high status partners was 599 (95% CI, -647.08 to 1,846.55) points lower than high status persons
paired with low status partners. There was not a statistically significant difference in mean
performance between these groups t(37) = .98, p = .85. For shared performance, the assumption
of homogeneity of variances was violated, as assessed by Levene’s test for equality of variances
(p = .035). The mean shared performance for high status persons paired with high status partners
was 749 points (95% CI, -171.45 to 1,669.84) lower than high status persons paired with low
status partners. However, there was not a statistically significant difference in mean performance
between groups t(37) = 1.65, p = .09.
The suggestion that high status dyads perform better in collaborative than competitive
situations was supported. The assumption of homogeneity of variances was violated, as assessed
by Levene’s test for equality of variances (p = .00). The mean shared performance for high status
persons paired with high status partners in collaborative situations was 3,296 points (95% CI,
1,191.63 to 5,400.88) higher than in competitive situations. There was a statistically significant
difference in mean performance scores between situations, t(41) = 3.1, p = .003. The following
set of hypotheses compares performance gains within collaborative situations. It is predicted that
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high status persons when paired with high status partners will achieve higher personal and shared
gains than when paired with low status partners. As for individual performance in collaborative
situations, high status persons with high status partners scored 738.78 points (95% CI, -2,694.42
to 1,216.89) higher than high status persons with low status partners. However, this difference
was not statistically significant t(43) = -.76, p = .98. For shared performance in collaborative
situations, high status persons when matched with low status partners scored 2,078.01 points
(95% CI, -5708.57 to 1552.41) lower than when matched with high status partners. There was
not a statistically significant difference in mean performance between groups t(43) = -1.15, p =
.063.
The next set of hypotheses suggests that within competitive situations, low status persons
with low status partners will perform worse than when paired with high status partners. As for
individual performance, low status people when paired with low status partners achieved higher
performance 10,105.00 than when paired high status partners 9,688.24, contrary to the stated
hypotheses. Low status persons with low status partners performed 416.77 points higher than
when paired with high status partners (95% CI, -1,298.46 to 2,131.99), but there was not a
statistically significant difference in mean performance between groups t(35)= .49, p=.26. As for
shared performance, low status persons with low status partners performed 59.8 points better
than those with high status partners, however, this was not a statistically significant difference
t(33)=-.23, p=.18.
The final set of hypotheses suggests that low status persons paired with low status
partners in a collaborative situation will perform lower than those paired with high status
partners. While there was not a statistically significant between these groups, the results were in
the predicted direction, with low status persons with low status partners reporting a lower

88

individual performance mean (8,952.94) than those with high status partners (10,290.00).
Similarly, low status partnerships with two low status members performed worse as a pair
(16,828.57) than low status and high status partnerships (20,445.45). As for individual
performance, low status persons with low status partners secured -1337 less points than those
with high status partners (95% CI, -3,337.82 to 663.70), but there was not a statistically
significant difference in mean performance between groups t(25)=-1.38, p=.38. In terms of
shared performance, low status persons when paired with low status partners scored -3616 points
lower than those with high status partners (95% CI, -6417 to -816), with no statistically
significant difference in mean performance between groups t(23)=-2.68, p=.55.
Discussion
Most of the results of this study did not reach statistical significance. However, apart
from low status dyad comparisons, the relationships were in the predicted direction. That is, the
relative performance of status pairings shifted based on situational cues. There were several
limitations of this study that likely contributed to a lack of statistically significant results. From a
methodological viewpoint, while the primes used in this study were adapted from prior research
studies, the manipulation checks revealed that while the status primes were effective in creating
differing perceptions of status, it was ineffective in creating differences in expectations for
respect. Similarly, the situational primes were ineffective. It could be that this study did not
include a strong enough prime to override the status orderings within the naturalistic setting.
Another possibility is that the structure of the negotiation payoffs made it difficult for partners to
collaborate versus compete when prompted to do so. While participants were instructed to keep
their payoff schedules unknown to their negotiation partner, a distributive payoff structure, or
scenario where greater performance for one partner equals weaker performance for their
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counterpart, might prevent partners from effectively cooperating with one another even when
presented with a collaborative prime. Future studies should develop specific strategies for
potential trade-offs between partners of different dyadic combinations for dealing with specific
issues.
Further, the data for this experiment was collected from classrooms where selection
biases and interaction effects likely played a role in the results. That is, the participants in this
study were students who negotiated with those closest in physical proximity to them, which
likely included friends or those with whom they have shared other formative experiences.
However, this study design did not account for familiarity or the quality of relationships between
negotiators. Similarly, while there is reason to believe that individual differences take on
meaning as status characteristics, this study did not measure traits such as extroversion and
dominance, for example. It would be interesting for future research to examine the potential
influence of individual characteristics such as these on both the actor’s role-playing and the
interaction partner’s perceptions of status assignments. In addition, future research could benefit
from field studies that might leverage the naturalistic emergence of status orderings within work
teams or organizations.
Another possibility is that status becomes especially salient for high status actors’
performance when pitted with or against other high status actors. Similarly, while it was not
explicitly hypothesized, the results of this study demonstrated that low status actors when paired
with other low status actors performed better in competitive situations than collaborative
situations. It could be the case that competitive situations create feelings of threat when actors
perceive themselves as being the same in status. The examination of status similarity, in
comparison to status distance, could be a fruitful area for future research. Indeed, while studies
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focusing on the influence of status have recently surged in the management literature, we know
comparatively less about the experience of low status and related outcomes.
Despite these null findings and study limitations, one key finding emerged that
contributes to existing research. That is, two high status actors perform substantially better when
reminded that a work setting is collaborative vs. competitive, with ensuing rewards for each
situation. Past findings on status conflict among high-powered dyads (Hildreth & Angus, 2016),
and self-perceived high status actors within teams (Kilduff et al., 2016) suggest that those who
perceive themselves as high status are destined to bring each other down. By focusing on
situational characteristics, this work presents an alternate view: status positions take on meaning
according to the given context. It is expected that high status actors competing against one
another will be focused on defending their respective positions. Thus, high status actors may be
more content to win more resources than their competitive partner, even if there are fewer
resources distributed overall. On the other hand, in collaborative situations, high status actors are
more likely to view their role as one of social responsibility. Thus, they are expected to claim
less for themselves and work harder to extract shared value. This perspective also adds valuable
nuance to our understanding of why conflict emerges in the first place. If high status actors are
especially engaged when placed in competitive scenarios, this provides a useful explanation for
why status conflicts are more detrimental than other types of disagreements (Bendersky & Hays,
2012). That is, when high status actors are preoccupied with maintaining their standing, they
may inadvertently engage in self-sabotaging behaviors by becoming distracted from the task at
hand. On the other hand, if high status actors are confident that their standing is not in jeopardy
and reminded to focus on shared goals, we are likely to observe an enhanced level of
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performance. These points help refine our understanding of dyadic conflict within organizational
settings.
It follows that high status actors should be able to create room for each other at the top,
especially in the absence of threat and when they are prompted to anchor on shared goals. This
research proposes that both conditions can be successfully met by situational circumstances.
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Figure 1: Overview of Essay 1
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Figure 2: Overview of Essay 2
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Figure 3: Overview of Essay 3
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Table 1
Essay 3: Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations among Study Variables
Variables
Mean
SD
1
2
3
4
1. Status
1.46
0.50
-2. Situation
1.49
0.50
-.10
-3. Gender
1.43
0.50
.15
.39*
-4. Race
2.03
1.02
.16*
.04
-.05
-*
5. Individual performance
10,203.38
2,515.95
-.19
.12
.02
-.11
6. Shared performance
20,222.53
3,624.94
-.21*
.40
-.13
-.07
Note. N = 156. Individual and shared performance are measured in number of negotiation points.
* p < .05
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5

-.49*

Table 2
ANOVA: Tests of Between-Subjects Effects on Shared Performance
Source
df
F
Corrected Model
3
6.88
Intercept
1
4,712.29
Status
1
6.99
Situation
1
0.81
Status*Situation
1
11.10
Error
140
Total
144
2
2
R = .128 (Adjusted R =.110)
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Sig.
.00
.00
.01
.37
.00

Table 3
Individual performance of status dyads in competitive situations
Means
Levene’s
t
df
p
Mean
test
difference
High-High
vs.
High-Low

19,227.27

High-Low
Vs.
Low-Low

19,976.47

Low-Low
vs.
High-High

19,916.67

Upper

.008

2.13
1.91

54

.04
.06

314.44

-737.75

1,366.63

.184

-.23

33

.82

59.8

-1,877.2

477.13

.00

1.69

38

.10

689.39

-1200.13

1,456.15

9,659.09

19,916.67

19,227.27

Table 4
Individual performance of status dyads in collaborative situations
Means
Levene’s
t
df
p
Mean
test
difference
High-High
vs.
High-Low

22,523.53

High-Low
Vs.
Low-Low

10,581.82

Low-Low vs.
High-High

95% CI
Lower

95% CI
Lower

Upper

.01

-1.59

54

.12

-2,078.08

-4,372.07

215.92

.44*

3.35

34

.00

3,616.88

1,422.99

5,810.78

.13*

3.43

46

.00

5,694.96

2,350.95

9,038.97

20,445.45

8,952.94
8,952.94
11,320.59
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Table 5
Individual performance of status dyads in competitive situations
Means
sd
Levene’s
t
df
p
Mean
95% CI
test
difference Lower
High-High
vs.
High-Low

10,258.82

1,797.24

9,659.09

1,984.14

High-Low
Vs.
Low-Low

10,105.00

3,078.87

10,258.82

1,797.24

Low-Low
vs.
High-High

9,659.09

1,984.14

10,105.00

3,078.87

.85

.98

36

.33

599.73

-647.08

1,846.55

.27

-.18

35

.85

-153.82

-1,877.2

1,569.61

.29

.56

40

.57

445.90

-1200.13

2091.94

Table 6
Individual performance of status dyads in collaborative situations
Means
sd
Levene’s
t
df
p
Mean
test
difference
High-High
vs.
High-Low

11,320.59

2,831.89

10,581.82

2,784.56

High-Low
Vs.
Low-Low

10,581.82

2,831.89

8,952.94

2,213.63

Low-Low
vs.
High-High

8,952.94

2,213.63

11,320.59

11,320.59

Upper

95% CI
Lower

Upper

.98

-.76

43

.45

-738.77

-2,694.42

1,216.88

.31

-1.7

26

.10

-1,628.88

-3,593.35

335.59

.20

-3.2

39

.00

-2,367.65

-3,820.57

-914.72
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Diagram 1
High status dyads’ performance across situations
23000

22000

Competitive

21000
Collaborative

20000
19000
18000
17000

Diagram 2
Status dyads’ performance in collaborative situations
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Diagram 3
Status dyads’ performance in competitive situations
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Appendix A
Essay 2 – Measurement Scales
Social Dominance Orientation Scale
(adapted from Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Some people are simply not the equals of others.
It is important that we treat others as equals.
Some people are just more worthy than others.
To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on others.
Some people are more deserving than others.
If people were treated more equally we would have fewer problems.
In an ideal world, all people would be equal.
Some people are just not as good as others.

All items were measured on a very negative (1) to very positive (7) scale; items 2, 6-7 were
reverse coded.
Original Social Dominance Orientation Scale
(Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994)
(not used in this study)
1. Some groups of people are simply not the equals of others.
2. Some people are just more worthy than others.
3. This country would be better off if we cared less about how equal all people were.
4. Some people are just more deserving than others.
5. It is not a problem if some people have more a of a chance in life than others.
6. Some people are just inferior to others.
7. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on others.
8. Increased economic equality.
9. Increased social equality.
10. Equality.
11. If people were treated more equally we would have fewer problems in this country.
12. In an ideal world, all nations would be equal.
13. We should try to treat one another as equals as much as possible.
14. It is important that we treat other countries as equals.
All items are measured on a very negative (1) to very positive (7) scale. Items 8-14 are reversecoded.

115

Appendix B
Competence/Warmth Behaviors Scale
(adapted from Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002)
1. Act as a mentor who supports the development of your colleagues.
2. Contribute to the company culture by contributing to a positive environment.
3. Focus on building relationships with your supervisor/co-workers.
4. Volunteer to serve on committees for employee interest groups.
5. Host or coordinate gatherings outside of work to foster relationships with co-workers.
6. Display awards you have won for your task accomplishments on your desk.
7. Work to solve a tough problem at work even though you were not expected to.
8. Make sure you appear to be an independent worker that needs little help from others.
9. Demonstrate your aptitude at taking the initiative and being a self-starter.
10. Keep track of how the work you contribute to the company is quantifiable (e.g., added
revenue or sales numbers).
11. Make sure that you do a better job than everyone else.
Items 1-5 are warmth behaviors, items 6-11 competence behaviors.

Original Competence/Warmth Behaviors Scale
(Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Volunteer outside your working hours to help your co-workers with their personal issues.
Use your personal time to help a coworker outside of working hours.
Congratulate the winner of ‘best office employee’ award.
Stay late at an office party even when you think everyone is pretty shallow.
Work late to be sure you did the best job possible on a work assignment.
Display awards you have won for your task accomplishments on your desk so your
supervisor will see them.
7. Work to solve a tough problem at work even though you were not expected to.
8. Make sure that you appear secure and able to answer questions in a coherent way when
called upon by your boss.
Items 1-4 are warmth behaviors, items 5-8 competence behaviors.
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Appendix C
Essay 2 – Cover Letters
Condition 1: High Competence/Low Warmth

To Whom It May Concern:
I am writing because I am interested in applying for this job position. To assure you that I will
perform well in this role, I would like to share some information about myself. As a leader, I
pride myself in delivering superior work with minimal guidance or direction. My high level of
expertise allows me to work independently and deliver results, by any means necessary.
Performance is the key to business. I do not let other people slow me down and I am motivated
to perform better than those around me.
These qualities make me the perfect candidate for this position. I look forward to hearing from
you in the future.
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Condition 2: High Warmth/Low Competence

To Whom It May Concern:
I am writing because I am interested in applying for a job position. To assure you that I will
perform well in this role, I would like to share some information about myself.
As a leader, I focus on developing the skills and talents of others. I am passionate about bringing
out the best in my colleagues and helping them perform to their fullest potential. I have learned
that relationships are the key to business. My track record of success comes from inspiring trust,
excitement, and enthusiasm in the people around me.
These qualities make me the perfect candidate for your position. I look forward to hearing from
you.
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Condition 3: High Warmth/High Competence

To Whom It May Concern:
I am writing because I am interested in applying for a job position.In order to assure you that
I will perform well in this role, I would like to share some information about myself.
As a leader, I pride myself in delivering superior work with minimal guidance or direction
and I also excel at developing the skills and talents of others. My high level of expertise
allows me to work independently and deliver results, by any means necessary. I do not let
other people slow me down and I am motivated to perform better than those around me. My
track record of success comes from inspiring trust, excitement, and enthusiasm in the people
around me.
These qualities make me the perfect candidate for your position. I look forward to hearing
from you.
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Condition 4: Low Warmth/Low Competence

To Whom It May Concern:
I am writing because I am interested in applying for a job position. In order to assure you that I
will perform well in this role, I would like to share some information about myself.
I am excited for the opportunity to get leadership training at your company. One day, I would
like to gain the skills required to work independently. I think that eventually I might be able to
gain experience and learn how to excel in these areas.
I look forward to hearing from you.
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Appendix D
Performance Evaluations
Condition 1: High Competence/Low Warmth
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Condition 2: High Warmth/Low Competence
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Condition 3: High Competence/High Warmth
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Condition 4: Low Competence/Low Warmth
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Appendix E: Essay 3 - Status Negotiations Materials
NEGOTIATOR INSTRUCTIONS: PINNACLE SERVICES INCORPORATED
In this study, you will be role playing a negotiation against another person. You will be playing
the role of an executive at Pinnacle Services Incorporated. Your company has recently agreed
to a merger with Mountain Enterprises. One of the important tasks that needs to be done in a
corporate merger is to make a variety of human resource management and compensation
decisions in order to make the salaries, bonuses, vacation packages, and other benefits that are
offered by the two companies consistent. This is the task you will be performing in this study.
You will meet with an executive from Mountain to negotiate these issues. You will be in the
role of the executive from Pinnacle; the other negotiator will be in the role of the executive from
Mountain.
There are 7 issues of concern in this negotiation:
Signing Bonus
Vacation Time
Starting Date For New College Graduates
Moving Expense Coverage
Insurance Coverage
Salary
Training Center Location
Your goal is to reach a settlement with the Mountain negotiator on all seven issues that is in the
best interests of the merged company. But, as the agent for Pinnacle, THE MORE POINTS
YOU EARN, THE BETTER. This is consistent with what you would expect when two
companies combine into one company. You may determine what type of agreement is best for
you by referring to the "PAYOFF SCHEDULE" on the next page.
The 7 issues are listed separately. Along the left-hand side under each issue are five different
settlement points for each issue. The number of points you will receive for each type of
agreement are shown in the column to the right. As a negotiator, you need to settle each issue,
though you can do so at any of the five levels on each issue. Thus there is a huge number of
possible agreements.
You should note that each issue has a different degree of importance to you, as indicated by the
number of points you could gain on each issue.
DO NOT AT ANY TIME TELL THE OTHER PERSON HOW MANY POINTS YOU ARE
GETTING. ALSO, DO NOT LET THE OTHER NEGOTIATOR SEE YOUR POINT
SCHEDULE. THIS INFORMATION IS FOR YOU ONLY.
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Please become very familiar with your PAYOFF schedule. The highest number of total points
you can obtain from this negotiation is 19,200 and the lowest number is zero.

Signing Bonus
Vacation Time
Starting Date For College Grads
Moving Expense Covered
Insurance Covered
Salary
Training Center Location
Total

Lowest
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Highest
1600
4000
2400
800
3200
6000
1200
19,200

DO NOT LET THE MOUNTAIN NEGOTIATOR SEE YOUR PAYOFF SCHEDULE
Your payoffs for each issue appear on the next two pages.
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Pinnacle Payoff Schedule
Signing Bonus
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%

Points
1600
1200
800
400
0

Vacation Time
25 days
20 days
15 days
10 days
5 days

Points
4000
3000
2000
1000
0

Starting Date For College Graduates
June 1
June 15
July 1
July 15
August 1

Points
2400
1800
1200
600
0

Moving Expense Coverage
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%

Points
800
600
400
200
0

Insurance Coverage
Plan A
Plan B
Plan C
Plan D
Plan E

Points
3200
2400
1600
800
0
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Pinnacle Payoff Schedule (Continued)

Salary
$50,000
$48,000
$46,000
$44,000
$42,000

Points
6000
4500
3000
1500
0

Training Center Location
Boston
New York
Chicago
Los Angeles
San Francisco

Points
0
300
600
900
1200

DO NOT LET THE MOUNTAIN NEGOTIATOR SEE YOUR PAYOFF SCHEDULE
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PINNACLE NEGOTIATION POINTS:
Below are some reasons Pinnacle has for why they prefer various settlements. We offer these to
help you determine arguments you may want to use in your discussions with Mountain for why
you prefer the settlement positions that you do. Feel free to bring up these arguments (or to
ignore these arguments) in your discussions with Mountain. Also, we encourage you to think of
additional reasons why you prefer the outcomes that you do.

SIGNING BONUS
Pinnacle has historically given out signing bonuses as a way of “sweetening the pot” for new
employees. Signing bonuses are attractive because they provide needed up front money to new
employees, but they do not add to long term costs because they are only paid to an employee
once. In contrast, Mountain does not even offer their employees signing bonuses (!), in spite of
the fact that 80% of companies now offer new employees signing bonuses. You are convinced
that signing bonuses are a big recruiting asset and you would like to see the merged company
institute them at a generous level (say, 10%).
Reasons that you might use to persuade Mountain to offer large signing bonuses include the
following:
1. Other companies offer lucrative signing bonuses.
2. They help new employees cover initial expenses.
3. Prior Pinnacle employees have received them, and new hires at Mountain who hear that
former Pinnacle employees used to get signing bonuses might feel upset.

VACATION TIME FOR NEW HIRES
Pinnacle employees have always received generous amounts of vacation time (25 days, in other
words, five weeks). In fact, it will be difficult for former Pinnacle employees to accept
reductions in their vacation time now that they work for the merged company. Therefore, you
would really like to see a change in policies to provide more vacation time for all employees.
Some arguments you can make for keeping vacation time at high levels are:
1. Employees will be able to perform better if offered sufficient time to rest.
2. Employees really care about work/family life balance these days, and giving employees time
off to spend time with their family will be perceived as a valuable reward by employees.
3. Some other forward-thinking companies offer 25 days.
4. Employees can use part of their vacation time to go through some training and development
programs at local colleges and universities.
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STARTING DATE FOR NEW COLLEGE GRADUATES
Pinnacle has always started college students as soon a possible, usually with a June 1st starting
date. There are several reasons that you would like to see new graduates start on an early date:
1. The summer months tend to be less busy. This gives the new hires a chance to get used to
work at a relatively less frantic pace. Employees who are around in the summer also have
more time to help new employees because they too are less busy.
2. New hires can help cover the jobs performed by other employees as June begins the peak
vacation period and they can cover these responsibilities.
3. Many college students like starting early so they can begin paying off their loans; others have
no desire to waste the first two months after graduation doing nothing.

MOVING EXPENSE COVERAGE
Pinnacle was always generous with moving expenses, covering 100% of the expenses. You
would like to see the merged company offer 100% coverage, as this is consistent with Pinnacle
corporate philosophy of treating new employees as well as possible (you feel that the early days
of an employee’s career with the company are a good predictor of whether they are happy with
the company long term, so whatever you can do to make the early days go as smoothly as
possible is good). Some arguments you can make for 100% coverage:
1. New hires have just graduated from college and will not be able to pay for moving expenses
– they need 100% coverage.
2. For many people it will be a long move and would be very expensive.
3. Many other companies offer 100%.
4. If bonuses are low AND we give only partial moving coverage, it is difficult for new hires to
manage their expenses.
5. Many new hires have just spent a fortune on their education and cannot afford another bill.
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INSURANCE COVERAGE
Plan E is the current coverage level Mountain employees have. It covers basic health issues but
does not cover the cost of prescriptions, dental, eye, or mental health visits. Pinnacle’s health
coverage was also with a plan much like Plan E. However, you would like to see the new
merged company provide as comprehensive a coverage plan as possible. In fact, the more
comprehensive, the better, as this might make former Pinnacle employees feel better about
working in the new merged company.
Benefits of the other plans beyond Plan E:
Plan D: Adds eye coverage
Plan C: Adds eye and dental coverage
Plan B: Adds eye, dental, and mental health coverage
Plan A: Adds eye, dental and mental health coverage, plus covers prescriptions with a $10
copay by the employee.

SALARY
Not surprisingly, an important issue to be determined is what the salary level of entry level
employees will be. At Pinnacle, the starting salaries were around $50,000 and you don’t see any
reason why the merged company should reduce that level of compensation for new hires. Higher
salaries would allow employees to attend evening classes in advanced programs at local
universities, further developing their skills.

TRAINING CENTER LOCATION
New Pinnacle employees (who are largely in the Western U.S.) begin by receiving two months
of training in San Francisco. New employees hired by Mountain receive some amount of
training (you aren’t sure how much) at the Mountain company training center, located in New
York. If Mountain’s training center becomes the training center for the merged company, it
would be a burden on former Pinnacle employees and their families if they have to be trained so
far away for two months. It would be great if they could be trained in a closer location. You are
unsure what will happen to the Pinnacle training center (one rumor is that it will be put up for
sale). So, while not a critical issue (it only affects employees for a short time), you would be
pleased if the training center for the merged company could be located out west.
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Important information for the Pinnacle Representatives:

Since your company is undergoing a merger, only one
person can serve as Chief Human Resources Officer
(CHRO). If you win this negotiation, you will be the
newest CHRO. However, if you lose by scoring fewer
points than your partner, they will win CHRO and you will
report to them from now on.

